The Second Malaysian Emergency (SME) was considered by the Malayan Communists to be a continuation of the first. In response the Malaysian Government developed strategies based on the success of the British in 1948-1960.
Ong Weichong, in 'Malaysia's defeat of armed communism: The second emergency, 1968-1989' attributes the defeat of the communists to Britain's experience of Empire where fighting small wars with limited resources and minimal force were the norm. While it was not the initial response Britain moved to the 'small war' response in the early years of the First Emergency.
Lieutenant General Harold Briggs adopted an integrated civil-military approach, placing all military and civilian security forces under civilian control. Briggs established a system of war executive committees at Federal, State and District level with the aim of developing 'closer civil-military cooperation, improve efficiency and prompt coordinated action ...'
As a result of their experience in earlier conflicts the British saw insurgencies as primarily civil actions with the military in a supporting role. Under Briggs there was a move away from large scale military sweeps to small patrols under the command of sergeants and corporals. These relied on 'the skills of native trackers, intelligence provided by surrendered enemy personnel ... and Special Branch infiltrators to target selected terrorists with the minimum force required ...'.
Rather than commit further military forces to the conflict the British increased the number of police and paramilitary forces. In one six month period police numbers increased from 9000 to 45000
The use of small decentralised army units improved the flow of intelligence between soldiers, police, public servants and the local population as a result of their closer contact. Junior 'officers learned to react quickly and effectively'. The air role was largely limited to harassment, bombing of carefully selected targets and transportation. Its main use was in the psychological war, dropping propaganda leaflets on the terrorists as they withdrew further and further into the jungle and broadcasting messages encouraging them to surrender.
Ong contrasts the British approach in Malaya with that of the Americans in Vietnam. The Americans adopted a classical big war approach, relying on their superior technology and firepower. Their indiscriminate use of force that inflicted heavy casualties on those they claimed to be defending lost them support among the local population and at home. In Malaya the coordinated civil-military approach accompanied with the use of minimal force protected the local populace and gained their support to defeat the communists.
SOURCE:
Ong Weichong. 'Malaysia's defeat of armed communism: The second emergency, 1968-1989'. Routledge. Oxon. 2015. Chapter 2
