Although the largest people group were Thai Moslems, in the
rural areas and some towns of the key districts of Sadao and Betong the Chinese
were either a significant minority or in some places the majority. Starting
with the wealthy all Chinese were finally ‘taxed’ to raise funds for food, medicine
and arms. In return the Communists provided protection, with the protected
areas experiencing significantly lower crime rates. Communist strongholds were
established in these areas, plus the Waeng district, again on the border. This
area was also close to the coast of Narathiwat. While most arms were purchased
from Thai dealers, some were obtained from overseas and landed at Narathiwat or
Pattani.
As they strengthened their presence in the area they also
established routes to enable them to move freely from one location to another.
They travelled by foot through Moslem areas, avoiding Malaysia. When travelling
they purchased food at inflated prices from the Moslems and compensated them scrupulously
for any damage done to their crops. Moslems were also given free medicine and,
at times, basic medical treatment.
The communists successfully gained the support of the
Chinese population, with an estimated 80% of the population 15 years and over
being sympathetic. Many gave active support, providing intelligence on the
movement of Thai police, couriers and militant recruits. Training camps were established
in the jungle, along with other camps for the hard-core guerrillas. In the early
days at least they avoided contact with the Thai border police, abandoning
camps for new ones rather than stand and fight.
The communists began to extend their operations into
Malaysia in 1966 with a few tentative guerrilla strikes. In 1968 they committed
to a renewed guerrilla war against Malaysia, initially limiting their
activities to the border areas of Kelantan, Perak and Kedah. They started
building camps in the Northern Malaysia jungle for training recruits,
indoctrinating Chinese youth, logistics, and from which to launch sporadic hit
and run attacks.
Large scale communal riots in 1969 created conditions seen
by the communists as conducive to their cause among disaffected members of the
Chinese community. Efforts to extend their influence in Peninsular Malaysia
increased with the building of new camps reaching almost to Kuala Lumpur,
efforts to recruit and train young Chinese, and the redevelopment of an
underground support network. This was accompanied by an increase in violence.
Communist activity intensified in 1974 following internal
divisions which resulted in the formation of two break-away groups. This led to
more spectacular and risky attacks than what might otherwise have been
expected. By the mid-1970s many new party cells had been formed and attacks had
taken place at least as far as 107 kilometres South East of Kuala Lumpur.
By the middle of 1975 four communist regiments were
operating on both sides of the Thai-Malaysian border and in the states of
Kedah, Perak, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu. There were also a number of assault
groups ranging in number from five to eighty men operating independently in the
same areas.
According to Ladd, Peninsular Malaysia, especially the Northern
and Central areas, faced a ‘serious security threat,’ albeit ‘not yet strong
enough to challenge the Government effectively for the control of this area.’
If they required additional manpower for operations in the
border area they could draw on a large number of young Thai Chinese who, while
not full-time militants had undergone some guerilla training. More importantly,
hard-pressed communist fighters could retreat to their Thailand sanctury where
they were safe from Malaysian forces and refresh before continuing the fight
with Malaysia.
Note: This two part post is based on the first of a two part
article on the Malaysian Insurgency by Thomas published in 1977.
Reference
M. Ladd Thomas, The Malayan Communist Insurgency, in Asian
Affairs, Vol. 4, No.5 (May – June., 1977), pp. 306-316, published by Taylor
& Francis, Ltd.
