The Coming of the Lie, Part 3

Specialist officers Wing Commanders J.A. Downie, SR (GD) (Senior Ground Defence Officer) and R.D. Barnes, PM (Provost Marshall) visited Butterworth during the period 4 – 12 May 1971. The purpose of their visit was to investigate security matters at the Base and to advise and make recommendations in light of recent concerns. A copy of their report was forwarded to the Secretary, Department of Defence by F.J. Green, who appears to have been the Secretary, Department of Air, on 28 May 71 (564/8/28 Pt 3, Folio 180, ‘Air Base Butterworth – Security’).

Their paper, ‘Report of Visit by SR(GD) and PM to Headquarters Air Base Butterworth 4th to 12th May 1971,’ dated 25th May 1971 (Folio 178) extended to 9 pages plus annexes. Understandably, it covers ground already covered in parts 1 and 2 of this series. That information will not be repeated.

In addition to key RAAF officers the Wing Commanders also consulted the Officer Commanding the Malaysian Military Police at Butterworth, a representative of the Malaysian Police Force at Alor Star, and received a briefing from representatives of the Malaysian Ministry of Defence.

Following close questioning of local ‘police and military authorities’ it was concluded they concurred with the 1971 JIO threat assessment for Butterworth. A summary was included in their report:

• It is unlikely that any armed action by formed bodies of troops from the CTO of Malaysian Nationalist Liberation Front (MNLF) will be mounted against the base within the next twelve months unless a favourable situation resulted from the diversion of the base security forces and local forces to quell civil disturbance.
• There is a continuing threat from unco-ordinated action by dissident individuals which could result in loss or damage to the assets of the base.
• There is no evidence to indicate that potential enemies have any indirect-fire weapon capability such as mortars.

As stated in Part 2, while the Malaysian Military Police were responsible for Base security, there was a possibility that they could all be withdrawn in response to a security situation elsewhere in the country leaving Butterworth vulnerable to communist attack.

The officers concluded that the threat assessment required a two phase defensive arrangement, ‘apart from the arrangements necessary to protect members, dependents and nominated personnel in the event of civil disturbance.’ These were:

• Day to day security measures to protect the base against the minor threat stated at paragraph 9.b. consisting of routine guarding measures; and,
• The capability to adopt an expanded security posture to counter the unlikely, but nevertheless possible, threat summarised at paragraph 9.a.

It is worth noting that the civil threat alone posed some risk to service members, their families and other civilians, such as teachers, in the Butterworth region to support the Australian presence. This threat alone should be sufficient to demonstrate this was not normal peacetime service as Defence maintain it was. But the threat assessment went further, recognising the possibility, even if unlikely, of an attack.

The officers reported that local RMAF members were ‘untrained in base defence measures and with the exception of aircrew … [were] unarmed.’ Therefore they could play no active role ‘in the base defence plan.’ A request from the Officer Commanding RMAF Butterworth for Australian assistance with training was being considered by the Commanding Officer Base Squadron Butterworth. The competence of the Malaysian Military Police was also questioned with some having been removed ‘for sleeping on duty.’ It was however expected that their performance would improve over time ‘with experience and contact with the RAAF Police.’

Serious reservations were held regarding the locally employed dog handlers (RAAF Auxiliaries referred to in Part 2). Doubts were held regarding their loyalty and it was considered unlikely they ‘would report for duty in an internal security situation.’ The Auxiliaries guarded the Mirage lines between1800 – 0600 hours daily, with two on duty at a time. They were armed with 9 mm pistols and 10 rounds of ammunition.

The Auxiliaries could contact the RAAF Duty Security Controller by portable radio in an emergency. The Security Controller would then despatch ‘one or more unarmed RAAF Police, or if considered necessary, assistance will be requested from the SSP [Malaysian Military Police] who are normally armed with automatic weapons.’ An interesting arrangement.

These arrangements left the Mirages unguarded between 0600 hours when the Auxiliaries stood down and 0800 when the squadrons stood to, and 1600 hours and 1800 hours, the period between squadron stand down and the Auxiliaries stand to. The Mirage lines were also left unguarded between 0600 hours and 0800 hours on non-working days, the period between Auxiliary stand down and SSP stand to.

At the time of writing the OC was taking action to address the guarding shortcomings and Canberra was taking action to replace the Auxiliaries with RAAF Guards and dogs (10 and 10). Action had also been taken to arm the RAAF Police tasked to respond to emergency calls to the Mirage lines.

Current defence arrangements which were described as being effectively ‘three relatively unco-ordinated agencies concerned with base defence’ – the RAAF, RMAF and SSP - were seen as inadequate . At appendix C to the report was a letter from the Officer Commanding RAAF Butterworth, Air Commodore I.S. Parker, to the Australian High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur, ‘Air Base Butterworth – Shared Defence’, dated 16 April 1971.

Air Commodore Parker pointed out that at a conference on 28 May 1970 regarding the protection of facilities shared by ANZUK and Malaysian and Singaporean forces, ‘the Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, preferred that the subject should not be raised at Butterworth for the time being.’ He believed, for reasons given below, that it was time to reconsider the situation:

• the take-over of day-to-day security by the Malaysian Military Police (wef 1 Apr 71);
• the increased strength of Malaysian Forces on the Air Base vis-à-vis RAAF;
• the need to treat the Air Base as an entity for security purposes;
• the fact that there will be periods during which the AS/NZ infantry company will not be available; and
• the unacceptable diversion of RAAF manpower which would be needed to secure all installations vital to the operation of the Air Base, some of which are either Malaysian facilities or in close proximity to areas where the RMAF is in strength.

The report concludes with the following recommendations to the Department of Defence:

• Finalize a shared defence agreement for Air Base Butterworth without delay.
• Ensure that an AUSTARM or ANZUK company is available to the OC Butterworth at al times he considers its presence necessary, or approve the deployment of RAAF Airfield Guards [ADGs] as a permanent Army replacement. (Note: The report considered that two flights of ADGs (67) would be required).
• Encourage the RMAF to improve their ground defence/security capability.
• Ensure the continued operation of RAAF Radio Butterworth. (Note: Comment on RAAF Radio Butterworth has been made previously in the post ‘Radio RAAF Butterworth’s Security Role, posted on 6th April).

On 28 May, three days after the report was received, F.J. Green, who appears to have been the Secretary, Department of Air, forwarded a copy to the Secretary, Department of Defence, under the cover of a letter ‘Air Base Butterworth – Security.’ Green wrote ‘The findings and recommendations of the report are therefore strongly supported by this department …’

Green commented on aspects of the report. Acknowledging Malaysian ‘nationalistic susceptibilities … particularly in relation to ownership and responsibility for defence of the Base, every effort should be made to ensure that the RAAF Officer Commanding is given responsibility for the defence of the Base.’

Regarding the Army Company presence he reiterated the fact its presence at Butterworth could not be ensured. He further stated that, ‘even in the event of a civil disturbance Officer Commanding Butterworth is required to obtain approval of Headquarters 28 CW Brigade before using personnel of the Company for the protection of dependents and protective security of the Base.’

He went on to say these matters had been discussed by the ‘Officer Commanding Butterworth, Commander ANZ Support Group and the High Commission and recommendations made that the company be available at all times and under the control of Officer Commanding Butterworth.’ If this recommendation could not be agreed to Green repeated the view that it would be necessary to provide two flights of ADGs ‘to ensure adequate security of RAAF assets.’

On the same day, Air Vice Marshall Read, Deputy Chief of Air Staff, wrote to the Minister for Defence through the Secretary of Air, attaching a copy of the report. He stated at paragraphs 2 and 3:

• Action has been taken within this Department on matters within our competence to deal with such as, the  replacement of the locally enlisted Police Auxiliaries by RAAF Security Guards. OC RAAF Butterworth is actioning other matters of a local nature such as, the closure of gaps in the guarding arrangements for the base.
• The main problems of shared defence, the role of the attached Army company … should be resolved without delay as they are considered necessary to enable Air Base Butterworth to adequately meet the assessed threat. Those items which  are outside the competence of this Department have been passed to the Department of Defence for consideration.

 

On 2 March 1972 the Secretary, Department of Defence, A. E. Tange, wrote to the Secretary, Department of Air, regarding ‘Security at Butterworth.’ The Secretary stated ‘It will be necessary for us shortly to brief the Minister for Defence on the outcome of various examinations that have been made of the security problem at Butterworth.’ (566/2/148 Pt 5, Folio 52).Tange outlined his understandings of the situation and asked for confirmation or correction. The following quotes are from the letter.

• There is a joint Malaysian-Australian plan for internal security which would be put into operation under the Australian Commander of the  base in an emergency. In addition, responsibility for day-to-day physical security is shared along agreed lines. But the performance of the Malaysian personnel involved is poor.
• Given the division of responsibilities agreed with the Malaysians, the fact that the Base is their property and occupied by them, and the sensitivity of the matter – especially in the performance of their personnel – it is to be recognised that security standards at the base will continue to fall short of those we should like to obtain. We must accept, in remaining at Butterworth, a higher degree of risk than we would if the Base were under the exclusive control of the RAAF. The additional risk is difficult to quantify but is assessed to be acceptable for the time being.
• … In addition, Malaysian reluctance having been overcome, the ANZUK force will now provide one infantry company on rotation through Butterworth on a full-time basis, ostensibly for training, flag-showing and a change of scene. The presence of this company will provide the Commander with a ready-reaction force which he can use inter alia to supplement elements available to him under the joint Malaysian-RAAF Plan, but short of an actual overt breach of security the Commander cannot use these troops for guard of other security duties.
• While COMANZUFOR [Commander, ANZUK Force] has responsibility for the security of all forces under his command, including RAAF at Butterworth, it is recognised that the question of Butterworth security overall is  very largely a bilateral Australian-Malaysian matter in which COMANZUFOR does not have standing.

Tange’s letter confirms agreement had been reached with Malaysia regarding a shared defence arrangement for Butterworth which gave the OC RAAF Butterworth responsibility for internal security. Further, it confirmed the full-time presence of an ANZUK infantry company at Butterworth as a ‘ready-reaction force.’

Part 1 of ‘The Coming of the Lie’ reported Defence’s claims that the presence of the rifle company at Butterworth was primarily for training purposes and to ‘provide a real sense of ground force presence in Malaysia for most of the year.’

On 29 May 2014 the Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence, the Hon. Stuart Robert MP, wrote to Dr, Dennis Jensen MP, Chair, Standing Committee on Petitions, enclosing a copy of the Nature of Service Branch’s report of 3 March 2014.  The Minister informed Dr Jensen that a ‘senior research officer … [had] conducted a thorough examination of available official documentation held at the Australian War Memorial and the National Archives of Australia.’

The evidence cited in Parts 1 to 3 of ‘The Coming of the Lie’ is found in ‘official documentation held at … the National Archives of Australia.’ It would, therefore, have been available to the ‘senior research officer’ in his or her ‘thorough examination of available official documentation held at … the National Archives of Australia.’ Yet there is no mention of it in the NOSB report. Why?

The evidence could not be clearer. At the time real concerns were held regarding Butterworth security, one of which was that fact that the Army Company’s presence could not be assured. In response to these concerns an infantry company was permanently deployed to Butterworth and placed at the disposal of the OC as a ‘ready-reaction force.’ The real reason for the deployment could not be revealed publicly owing the Malaysian sensitivities and so the purpose of ‘training, flag-showing and a change of scene’ were used as a cover.

The lie, which Defence maintain to this day, had been established.

Further posts will continue this theme.

SOURCES:

National Australian Archives, NAA: A703, 564/8/28 Part 3, RAAF Butterworth – Ground defence plans

National Australian Archives, NAA: A703, 566/2/148 Part 5, Formation, organisation and movement – HQ RAAF Butterworth

The Coming of the Lie, Part 2

In the introduction to their paper ‘Security of Australian Personnel and Assets Air Base Butterworth’, dated 27 April 1971, Wing Commanders J.A. Downie, SR (GD) and R.D. Barnes, PM, point to political and security instability experienced in Malaysia since the end of the Emergency, dissident activity in the Kulim area and the possible threat to Butterworth.

The general political and security situation in Malaysia has been unstable since period of the Emergency. The riots of 1967 and 1969 culminating in the formation of the National Operation Committee has been an indication of the measure of this condition. Dissident action in the Kulim district has drawn attention to the possible vulnerability of Butterworth …

The authors note that the situation has been given publicity in Australia, listing three recent newspaper articles critical of security at Butterworth as evidence:

• ‘Our Defences are Down’, J. Hoffman, Sydney Morning Herald, March 11.
• ‘Rebels Threaten RAAF Bases’, Sydney Sunday Telegraph, 18 April.
• ‘Our Vulnerable Base’, Mike Cavanaugh, Canberra News, 22 April.

The paper had as its aim ‘to study the threat to Air Base Butterworth, and the adequacy of the defence arrangements.’ To achieve its purpose it was broken into four sections:

• Threat Assessment
• Comments on Available Forces
• Conclusions
• Recommendations

The paper was forwarded to the DCAS under the cover of a minute dated 28 April 71 from the DGOR. The DGOR explained that the report was based on ‘departmental files and from signals between us and Butterworth.’ (Folio 114)

Threat Assessment

There was little in the threat assessment that added to information already known as reported in Part 1. Of the estimated 25,000 communists in the border region 1,200 to 1,500 were believed to be CTs. Little intelligence information was available from the local population for fear of communist reprisals. A recent attack on railway tracks – not bridge as had been reported in newspaper article – had been attributed to the work of dissidents, not militants, for propaganda rather than military purposes. Acknowledging that any estimate of the seriousness of the threat to Butterworth was ‘largely guesswork’ it concluded the ‘immediate risk’ did ‘not appear to be great.’ To date, attacks had been for propaganda rather than military objectives, and an attack on a facility such as Butterworth may result in military reprisals the communists were not yet prepared to risk. This did not mean the risk of attack could be ignored with the most likely threat being uncoordinated actions by dissident groups.

Malaysia had assumed responsibility for ‘the day to day peacetime security’ of the Base on 1 April 1971. This responsibility had previously resided with the RAF Regiment (NOSB, 2014, para. 17). The Malaysian Ministry of Defence had made a total of 266 MMP (Malaysian Military Police) available for this role, which included ‘entry control, security guarding and part of the normal base patrol measures.’  The RAAF employed a team of locally employed civilians, RAAF Police Auxiliaries to guard the Mirage lines. These were trained dog handlers. Additionally, the RAAF Service Police patrolled base married quarters. These arrangements had ‘proved satisfactory to date to meet the guarding requirements in a normal situation.’

A security plan was in place ‘To protect service property and nominated persons in the Butterworth area’ to protect against ‘covert of overt action caused or threatened by CTs or dissidents …’ The plan was to be implemented in four stages according to the threat level to combat ‘sabotage or malicious damage; civil unrest arising from racial troubles or industrial disputes; the withdrawal of civil labour; and interruption to essential services such as light, water, supplies and waste disposal.’ It relied heavily on RAAF manpower that could be supplemented by other resources if available.

Comments on Available Forces

The report identified deficiencies with the current arrangements.

Malaysian Military Police

The MMP were responsible for security of the Base and certain Malaysian assets and would continue in this role in an emergency. However, their presence could not be assured as they ‘could be withdrawn by a higher authority in part or in toto in an internal security situation.’ Little wonder the authors stated ‘This is a most unsatisfactory situation for the base commander.’

RAAF Auxiliaries

Prior to the introduction of the MMP the RAAF had employed 110 Auxiliary indigenous dog handlers. Although this Force had since been disbanded 14 were retained to provide security for RAAF assets, including the Mirages and bomb dump. This measure was opposed by Headquarters Butterworth on competency grounds. No action to date had been taken on a proposal to replace auxiliaries with 15 RAAF Security Guards.

Base Combatant Personnel

RAAF personnel were considered sufficiently trained for their secondary security role. However, a prolonged emergency could seriously impact their primary role and the function of the Base. Prolonged absence of a member in a security situation could have an adverse effect on family morale.

Australian Army Elements

The army role was under consideration. Its presence could not be guaranteed owing to both planned and unplanned absences and could not therefore be integrated into the defence plan. The report’s authors considered it should ‘be regarded as a bonus’ if it was ‘available during a situation requiring its deployment.’

External Forces Committed to the Base Security Plan

The availability of other Commonwealth forces in the area, including those at Minden Barracks, were likewise considered a bonus as their future in the area was uncertain.

Conclusions

The report recognised available intelligence was inadequate to make an accurate assessment of the situation. While the threat to the Base had not increased of late, it could escalate with deteriorating political or racial conditions.

Forces available to the Officer Commanding would be adequate to meet current and future threats if their presence could be guaranteed, the Auxiliary dog handling force was inadequate, and reliance on Base combatant personnel in a prolonged security ‘could adversely affect the primary function of the RAAF component’.

Recommendations

These included:

• All possible steps be taken to obtain, evaluate and disseminate to interested parties intelligence regarding the Butterworth area.
• Defining the role and availability of all resources for the Defence of Butterworth, including the MMP, Australian Army Element and other forces.
• If sufficient resources could not be guaranteed, arranging for their replacement. Regarding the Army, replacing these with RAAF resources.
• Replacing the Auxiliary dog handlers with 15 RAAF Security Guards.
• Developing a deployment plan for relieving base combatant personnel in a prolonged situation.
• Appropriate staff officers visit Butterworth to investigate the situation in order to advise and make recommendations for the improvement of Butterworth security.

The DGOR advised in his minute of 28 April to the DCAS that this last recommendation would require ministerial approval.

The following day, Air Commodore G.T. Newstead, DGOR, advised the DGPS that the DCAS had approved the travel and requested the DGPS to obtain ministerial approval for one of the officers. He was to make arrangements for the other.

Less than a week later, as confirmed by correspondence addressed to the Secretary, Department of Defence, ‘Air Base Butterworth – Security’, from F.J. Green, identified as ‘Secretary’ of 5 May, the two staff officers were in Butterworth (folio 152).

Sources:

• National Australian Archives, NAA: A703, 564/8/28 Part 3, RAAF Butterworth – Ground defence plans
• Nature of Service Branch, Department of Defence, ‘Background Paper Parliamentary Petition Dated 3 March 2014 Rifle Company Butterworth 1970-1989’, 28 April 2014

The Coming of the Lie, Part 1

Defence’s Nature of Service Branch (NOSB), in its “Background Paper Parliamentary Petition, Dated 3 March 2014, Rifle Company Butterworth 1970-1989”, draw on documents from the 1969 – 1971 period in an attempt to underline their position that the primary role of army companies rotated through Butterworth in the period to the end of the Insurgency War in 1989 were primarily deployed for training purposes and to ‘provide a real sense of ground force presence in Malaysia for most of the year’ (para. 50) . They claim the rotation of an ANZUK company from the 28th Commonwealth Brigade based in Singapore commenced in 15 November 1970. While there would be periods throughout the year when the company would be required elsewhere owing to Brigade commitments elsewhere, it could, when present, be placed at the disposal of the Officer Commanding (OC) Butterworth if required in a security emergency (Para’s. 3, 49-60). These facts are not contested.

However, significant developments during 1971 led to the permanent deployment of an infantry company to Butterworth for security purposes. Because of the political sensitivities at the time, the real reason for the company’s presence remained ‘secret’ with its presence being explained as for training, ground presence and flag flying.

This is the first of a series of posts (number to be determined) examining the available evidence from 1971 to early 1972 leading to the development of the ‘training’ lie. Documents referred to are located in the National Australian Archives and are available to the public – and therefore the NOSB researcher.

On 11 March 1971, the Australian High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, J.R. Rowland, wrote to representatives of the Departments of Foreign Affairs (Attn. Mr M.J. Cook), Defence (Attn. Mr. G. Blakers, OBE, and JIO), Air (Attn. DAFI) and Headquarters RAAF, Air Base Butterworth (Attn. Air Cdre I.S. Parker, DFC, AFC) in  memo headed ‘Air Base Butterworth – Security’ (Folio 107). Attached was ‘a record of conversation between the Deputy Director Military Intelligence [Lt. Col. Ahmad Bin Haji Abdul Kadir, ABS, PKK] and the Services Adviser staff [Group Captain J.C. Thorp and Lt. Col. R.J. Gardner, OBE] concerning the general security situation in Malaysia.’ The readers’ attention was drawn particularly ‘to the reference to … Butterworth security in general and the CTO [Communist Terrorist Organisation] activity in the Kulim district in particular.’ He advised that his office had ‘been watching the situation in … [this] area for some time’ and reminded readers that he had previously asked if ‘Butterworth was on a general distribution list of intelligence information …’

While the High Commissioner acknowledged the Lt. Col. considered the threat ‘more serious than Special Branch’ it was considered that as the army was closer to the threat their view was credible. Lt. Col. Ahmad was judged by the Australian officers to be ‘of good quality, apparently well trained in all aspects of his duties … a clear and progressive thinker and … obviously concerned over the situation on the Thai/Malaysian border.’ His information was considered ‘highly reliable’, since a lot of it was already known and hence easy to corroborate.

 Because of the closeness of Butterworth to operations against the communists in the border areas the High Commission staff had been concerned for some time about the possible threat to the base. This concern had been heightened by the discovery of communist camps in the Kulim area and evidence the CTs [Communist Terrorists] were moving back into what had been a ‘bad area’ during the earlier Emergency. Air bases had proved popular targets to terrorists in Vietnam and, later, Cambodia, with attacks being launched from surrounding areas by mortar or by satchel attacks on aircraft placed by infiltrators. While it was considered that mortar attacks were improbable given there was no evidence the CTs possessed these, it was foreseen that the communists could consider Butterworth an attractive target. These attacks could be against the RMAF in reprisal for operations conducted against the CTs, or the Mirages as the Communists considered Butterworth a foreign base. While the High Commissioner considered ‘the immediate risk may not be great … the  report of an attack against a railway bridge only eight miles from the base does suggest that it could be unwise to disregard the possibility of some trouble.’

The Malaysian Officer agreed that efforts by the Army against the enemy in the border area had recently deteriorated owing to a shift in focus for military operations. He saw this as potentially making it easier for the CTO infiltrate the southern area of the 6th Malaysian Infantry Brigade’s [6MIB] territory – which included the area around Butterworth.

While official estimated strength of the MNLF [Malayan National Liberation Front] in the border region was 15,000 the Officer considered this to be more like 20,000. Additionally, there were an estimated 27,000 sympathisers in the Penang/Province Wellesley area, some of whom may have been employed on the Base.

An estimated 20 militants had been active in the Kulim area, probably from May 1970. Their aim at this stage was to re-establish contacts with supporters, establish a training complex and recruit from the local population. A militant captured in January 1971 disclosed the recent movement of 24 trainees into the area.

Lt. Col. Ahmad reported ‘the threat to all RMAF Bases was now very seriously regarded’ and, apart from anything else an attack ‘would be a good moral victory for the CTO.’ He assessed Butterworth ‘a probable target’ owing to the number of sympathisers in the area and the recent increase in enemy numbers.

In paragraph 7 of his 8 paragraph memorandum the High Commissioner wrote:

The present memorandum is simply for your information; I have thought that your attention should be drawn to the matter, because of the important policy implications for us if at some point there were to be some attack which resulted in the loss or damage of Australian equipment, or even Australian lives. Presumably, acceptance of such a risk is a necessary corollary of our being at Butterworth at all, but you may like to consider at which point you might which to put Ministers in the picture.

As will be seen in the next post, if ministers were not put ‘in the picture’ following receipt of the memo, it would not be long before one Minister in particular began to take an active interest in the matter.

Source

National Australian Archives, NAA: A703, 564/8/28 PART 3, ‘RAAF Butterworth – Ground defence plans’, folios 107 – 102.