Malaysia's commitment to the non-communist block was evidenced by its agreement to retain ANZUK forces within its borders for defence against external aggression. Its reluctance to join SEATO, at least in part, was the belief that many of the large Malaysian Chinese community viewed it as 'an American device for containing China in support of American policy.' SEATO membership may have heightened existing tensions between the Chinese and Malay communities.
The first major difficulty faced by the neighbours was a Muslim separatist movement in Southern Thailand. Four of the five Thai provinces closest to the shared border had significant Muslim majorities, ranging from 61 to 83 percent. The other was home to 19 percent Muslims. In all, the total Muslim population was close to one million.
Linguistically and in religious practice this group were quite similar to their southern neighbours. Some of its leaders were based in Kelantan from where it was able to source funds and some military supplies. The population of Kelantan and other northern Malaysian states were generally sympathetic to the separatists.
Although the Malaysian Government had not in any way supported the separatists for domestic political reasons it had been reluctant to act against them. On the other hand, the Thai’s were concerned domestic political pressure may force the Malaysian Government to support the Thai Muslims in one way or another.
The other sticking point in the relationship was the presence of the Malayan Communists in Southern Thailand. When the few hundred remaining Malay Communists took refuge in Thailand at the end of the 1948 - 1960 Emergency the Thais were not concerned, believing with time they would fade away. Further, Thailand did not have the resources to commit to their eradication. The Communist growth and the fact they had established what in effect were 'liberated zones' and in some places by the mid to late sixties caused a rethink of the situation.
Although Thailand increased its activities against the Communists commencing in 1965 through to the early seventies Thomas claims the way they went about it is evidence shows they did not take the threat seriously. In fact, Thomas states that the main reason for Thai indifference to the Communists was likely the widely held view 'that so long as the MCIs [Malayan Communist Insurgents] existed as a limited but potentially grave threat to the Malaysian government, the latter would refrain from lending support to separatist elements among the Thai Muslim population of South Thailand. In other words, the Thai’s saw the Malayan Communists as a safeguard against Malaysian interference in Thailand's Muslim Insurgency.
The growth in Communist numbers and influence did, however, create some concerns for Thailand. First, there was the possibility the Malayan Communists could cooperate with their Thai counterparts against Thailand. Then there was the likelihood of cooperation with Muslim separatists. Thomas considered both prospects unlikely. Cooperation with the Thai Communists would result in increased against them, thus jeopardising the relative safety they enjoyed in the country. It would also distract from their objective to overturn the Malaysian Government.
Although there was some concern the Malayan Communists could join their Thai counterparts but Thomas considered this unlikely. Resulting Thai action would jeopardise the relative safety they enjoyed in the country and any cooperation with the Thai Communists would divert resources necessary for achieving their objective, as would cooperation with the Muslims. Further Thomas believed that the Muslims and Communists were ideologically incompatible and cooperation would alienate the Muslim supporter base south of the border.
Increased activity from 1965 on did include cooperation with Malaysia. This included intelligence sharing, allowing Malaysian forces to pursue guerillas for up to five miles across the border, joint border patrols and the stationing of some Malaysian security personnel and helicopters in South Thailand. These moves had little real effect.
In early 1976 around 3000 Malaysian security forces with substantial air support pursued a guerrilla group across the border. This resulted in the capture of three camps and some Communist casualties. Several follow-up operations followed, including bombing by aircraft and interrogation of Thai citizens. This resulted in mass demonstrations in the border districts resulting in the Thai’s expelling Malaysian forces and stopping the Malaysians pursuing insurgents into Thai territory.
In October 1976 the Thai government was overthrown by a military coup. The new regime was strongly anti-communist and commenced negotiations with Malaysia on a new agreement. Signed in March 1977, shortly before the publication of Thomas's article, a provision of the agreement allowed combined operations led by a Combined Task Force Commander.
This agreement proved crucial. According to a Malaysian Army history combined operations commencing in early 1977 continued into 1981. These involved a total of 22 infantry battalions with Malaysian forces comprising 80 percent of the forces involved in each operation.
The Singapore Monitor of 11 February 1983, in an article ‘Reds infiltrating the peninsular, says Musa: Guerillas trying to spread out from border hideouts,’ Malaysian Deputy Premier Datuk Musa Hitam stated Communist Terrorists were trying to spread out along the Peninsular as a result of the successes of operations in the border areas. Although Musa did not disclose the number of terrorists in the border region Thai authorities estimated the number to be around 3000.
Although the Malaysian Government had not in any way supported the separatists for domestic political reasons it had been reluctant to act against them. On the other hand, the Thai’s were concerned domestic political pressure may force the Malaysian Government to support the Thai Muslims in one way or another.
The other sticking point in the relationship was the presence of the Malayan Communists in Southern Thailand. When the few hundred remaining Malay Communists took refuge in Thailand at the end of the 1948 - 1960 Emergency the Thais were not concerned, believing with time they would fade away. Further, Thailand did not have the resources to commit to their eradication. The Communist growth and the fact they had established what in effect were 'liberated zones' and in some places by the mid to late sixties caused a rethink of the situation.
Although Thailand increased its activities against the Communists commencing in 1965 through to the early seventies Thomas claims the way they went about it is evidence shows they did not take the threat seriously. In fact, Thomas states that the main reason for Thai indifference to the Communists was likely the widely held view 'that so long as the MCIs [Malayan Communist Insurgents] existed as a limited but potentially grave threat to the Malaysian government, the latter would refrain from lending support to separatist elements among the Thai Muslim population of South Thailand. In other words, the Thai’s saw the Malayan Communists as a safeguard against Malaysian interference in Thailand's Muslim Insurgency.
The growth in Communist numbers and influence did, however, create some concerns for Thailand. First, there was the possibility the Malayan Communists could cooperate with their Thai counterparts against Thailand. Then there was the likelihood of cooperation with Muslim separatists. Thomas considered both prospects unlikely. Cooperation with the Thai Communists would result in increased against them, thus jeopardising the relative safety they enjoyed in the country. It would also distract from their objective to overturn the Malaysian Government.
Although there was some concern the Malayan Communists could join their Thai counterparts but Thomas considered this unlikely. Resulting Thai action would jeopardise the relative safety they enjoyed in the country and any cooperation with the Thai Communists would divert resources necessary for achieving their objective, as would cooperation with the Muslims. Further Thomas believed that the Muslims and Communists were ideologically incompatible and cooperation would alienate the Muslim supporter base south of the border.
Increased activity from 1965 on did include cooperation with Malaysia. This included intelligence sharing, allowing Malaysian forces to pursue guerillas for up to five miles across the border, joint border patrols and the stationing of some Malaysian security personnel and helicopters in South Thailand. These moves had little real effect.
In early 1976 around 3000 Malaysian security forces with substantial air support pursued a guerrilla group across the border. This resulted in the capture of three camps and some Communist casualties. Several follow-up operations followed, including bombing by aircraft and interrogation of Thai citizens. This resulted in mass demonstrations in the border districts resulting in the Thai’s expelling Malaysian forces and stopping the Malaysians pursuing insurgents into Thai territory.
In October 1976 the Thai government was overthrown by a military coup. The new regime was strongly anti-communist and commenced negotiations with Malaysia on a new agreement. Signed in March 1977, shortly before the publication of Thomas's article, a provision of the agreement allowed combined operations led by a Combined Task Force Commander.
This agreement proved crucial. According to a Malaysian Army history combined operations commencing in early 1977 continued into 1981. These involved a total of 22 infantry battalions with Malaysian forces comprising 80 percent of the forces involved in each operation.
The Singapore Monitor of 11 February 1983, in an article ‘Reds infiltrating the peninsular, says Musa: Guerillas trying to spread out from border hideouts,’ Malaysian Deputy Premier Datuk Musa Hitam stated Communist Terrorists were trying to spread out along the Peninsular as a result of the successes of operations in the border areas. Although Musa did not disclose the number of terrorists in the border region Thai authorities estimated the number to be around 3000.
NOTE:
Thomas based his views on informal discussions with 400 representatives of the Muslim and Chinese communities in Southern Thailand, as well as Government officials.
SOURCES:
Thomas based his views on informal discussions with 400 representatives of the Muslim and Chinese communities in Southern Thailand, as well as Government officials.
SOURCES:
- M. Ladd Thomas. ‘The Malayan Communist Insurgents and Thai-Malaysian Relations’.
- Mohamed Ghazemy Mahmud (Translator). ‘The Malaysian Army’s Battle Against Communist Insurgency 1968-1989’. Army Headquarters, Ministry of Defence, Wisma Pertahanan, Jalan Padang Tembak, 50634 Kuala Lumpur. First Printing and originally published in 2001 in the Malay language as ‘Tentera Darat Manentang Insurgensi Komunis 1968-1989.
- Singapore Monitor. ‘Reds infiltrating the peninsular, says Musa: Guerillas trying to spread out from border hideouts.’ 11 February 1983, page 7.
