The Coming of the Lie, Part 3

Specialist officers Wing Commanders J.A. Downie, SR (GD) (Senior Ground Defence Officer) and R.D. Barnes, PM (Provost Marshall) visited Butterworth during the period 4 – 12 May 1971. The purpose of their visit was to investigate security matters at the Base and to advise and make recommendations in light of recent concerns. A copy of their report was forwarded to the Secretary, Department of Defence by F.J. Green, who appears to have been the Secretary, Department of Air, on 28 May 71 (564/8/28 Pt 3, Folio 180, ‘Air Base Butterworth – Security’).

Their paper, ‘Report of Visit by SR(GD) and PM to Headquarters Air Base Butterworth 4th to 12th May 1971,’ dated 25th May 1971 (Folio 178) extended to 9 pages plus annexes. Understandably, it covers ground already covered in parts 1 and 2 of this series. That information will not be repeated.

In addition to key RAAF officers the Wing Commanders also consulted the Officer Commanding the Malaysian Military Police at Butterworth, a representative of the Malaysian Police Force at Alor Star, and received a briefing from representatives of the Malaysian Ministry of Defence.

Following close questioning of local ‘police and military authorities’ it was concluded they concurred with the 1971 JIO threat assessment for Butterworth. A summary was included in their report:

• It is unlikely that any armed action by formed bodies of troops from the CTO of Malaysian Nationalist Liberation Front (MNLF) will be mounted against the base within the next twelve months unless a favourable situation resulted from the diversion of the base security forces and local forces to quell civil disturbance.
• There is a continuing threat from unco-ordinated action by dissident individuals which could result in loss or damage to the assets of the base.
• There is no evidence to indicate that potential enemies have any indirect-fire weapon capability such as mortars.

As stated in Part 2, while the Malaysian Military Police were responsible for Base security, there was a possibility that they could all be withdrawn in response to a security situation elsewhere in the country leaving Butterworth vulnerable to communist attack.

The officers concluded that the threat assessment required a two phase defensive arrangement, ‘apart from the arrangements necessary to protect members, dependents and nominated personnel in the event of civil disturbance.’ These were:

• Day to day security measures to protect the base against the minor threat stated at paragraph 9.b. consisting of routine guarding measures; and,
• The capability to adopt an expanded security posture to counter the unlikely, but nevertheless possible, threat summarised at paragraph 9.a.

It is worth noting that the civil threat alone posed some risk to service members, their families and other civilians, such as teachers, in the Butterworth region to support the Australian presence. This threat alone should be sufficient to demonstrate this was not normal peacetime service as Defence maintain it was. But the threat assessment went further, recognising the possibility, even if unlikely, of an attack.

The officers reported that local RMAF members were ‘untrained in base defence measures and with the exception of aircrew … [were] unarmed.’ Therefore they could play no active role ‘in the base defence plan.’ A request from the Officer Commanding RMAF Butterworth for Australian assistance with training was being considered by the Commanding Officer Base Squadron Butterworth. The competence of the Malaysian Military Police was also questioned with some having been removed ‘for sleeping on duty.’ It was however expected that their performance would improve over time ‘with experience and contact with the RAAF Police.’

Serious reservations were held regarding the locally employed dog handlers (RAAF Auxiliaries referred to in Part 2). Doubts were held regarding their loyalty and it was considered unlikely they ‘would report for duty in an internal security situation.’ The Auxiliaries guarded the Mirage lines between1800 – 0600 hours daily, with two on duty at a time. They were armed with 9 mm pistols and 10 rounds of ammunition.

The Auxiliaries could contact the RAAF Duty Security Controller by portable radio in an emergency. The Security Controller would then despatch ‘one or more unarmed RAAF Police, or if considered necessary, assistance will be requested from the SSP [Malaysian Military Police] who are normally armed with automatic weapons.’ An interesting arrangement.

These arrangements left the Mirages unguarded between 0600 hours when the Auxiliaries stood down and 0800 when the squadrons stood to, and 1600 hours and 1800 hours, the period between squadron stand down and the Auxiliaries stand to. The Mirage lines were also left unguarded between 0600 hours and 0800 hours on non-working days, the period between Auxiliary stand down and SSP stand to.

At the time of writing the OC was taking action to address the guarding shortcomings and Canberra was taking action to replace the Auxiliaries with RAAF Guards and dogs (10 and 10). Action had also been taken to arm the RAAF Police tasked to respond to emergency calls to the Mirage lines.

Current defence arrangements which were described as being effectively ‘three relatively unco-ordinated agencies concerned with base defence’ – the RAAF, RMAF and SSP - were seen as inadequate . At appendix C to the report was a letter from the Officer Commanding RAAF Butterworth, Air Commodore I.S. Parker, to the Australian High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur, ‘Air Base Butterworth – Shared Defence’, dated 16 April 1971.

Air Commodore Parker pointed out that at a conference on 28 May 1970 regarding the protection of facilities shared by ANZUK and Malaysian and Singaporean forces, ‘the Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, preferred that the subject should not be raised at Butterworth for the time being.’ He believed, for reasons given below, that it was time to reconsider the situation:

• the take-over of day-to-day security by the Malaysian Military Police (wef 1 Apr 71);
• the increased strength of Malaysian Forces on the Air Base vis-à-vis RAAF;
• the need to treat the Air Base as an entity for security purposes;
• the fact that there will be periods during which the AS/NZ infantry company will not be available; and
• the unacceptable diversion of RAAF manpower which would be needed to secure all installations vital to the operation of the Air Base, some of which are either Malaysian facilities or in close proximity to areas where the RMAF is in strength.

The report concludes with the following recommendations to the Department of Defence:

• Finalize a shared defence agreement for Air Base Butterworth without delay.
• Ensure that an AUSTARM or ANZUK company is available to the OC Butterworth at al times he considers its presence necessary, or approve the deployment of RAAF Airfield Guards [ADGs] as a permanent Army replacement. (Note: The report considered that two flights of ADGs (67) would be required).
• Encourage the RMAF to improve their ground defence/security capability.
• Ensure the continued operation of RAAF Radio Butterworth. (Note: Comment on RAAF Radio Butterworth has been made previously in the post ‘Radio RAAF Butterworth’s Security Role, posted on 6th April).

On 28 May, three days after the report was received, F.J. Green, who appears to have been the Secretary, Department of Air, forwarded a copy to the Secretary, Department of Defence, under the cover of a letter ‘Air Base Butterworth – Security.’ Green wrote ‘The findings and recommendations of the report are therefore strongly supported by this department …’

Green commented on aspects of the report. Acknowledging Malaysian ‘nationalistic susceptibilities … particularly in relation to ownership and responsibility for defence of the Base, every effort should be made to ensure that the RAAF Officer Commanding is given responsibility for the defence of the Base.’

Regarding the Army Company presence he reiterated the fact its presence at Butterworth could not be ensured. He further stated that, ‘even in the event of a civil disturbance Officer Commanding Butterworth is required to obtain approval of Headquarters 28 CW Brigade before using personnel of the Company for the protection of dependents and protective security of the Base.’

He went on to say these matters had been discussed by the ‘Officer Commanding Butterworth, Commander ANZ Support Group and the High Commission and recommendations made that the company be available at all times and under the control of Officer Commanding Butterworth.’ If this recommendation could not be agreed to Green repeated the view that it would be necessary to provide two flights of ADGs ‘to ensure adequate security of RAAF assets.’

On the same day, Air Vice Marshall Read, Deputy Chief of Air Staff, wrote to the Minister for Defence through the Secretary of Air, attaching a copy of the report. He stated at paragraphs 2 and 3:

• Action has been taken within this Department on matters within our competence to deal with such as, the  replacement of the locally enlisted Police Auxiliaries by RAAF Security Guards. OC RAAF Butterworth is actioning other matters of a local nature such as, the closure of gaps in the guarding arrangements for the base.
• The main problems of shared defence, the role of the attached Army company … should be resolved without delay as they are considered necessary to enable Air Base Butterworth to adequately meet the assessed threat. Those items which  are outside the competence of this Department have been passed to the Department of Defence for consideration.

 

On 2 March 1972 the Secretary, Department of Defence, A. E. Tange, wrote to the Secretary, Department of Air, regarding ‘Security at Butterworth.’ The Secretary stated ‘It will be necessary for us shortly to brief the Minister for Defence on the outcome of various examinations that have been made of the security problem at Butterworth.’ (566/2/148 Pt 5, Folio 52).Tange outlined his understandings of the situation and asked for confirmation or correction. The following quotes are from the letter.

• There is a joint Malaysian-Australian plan for internal security which would be put into operation under the Australian Commander of the  base in an emergency. In addition, responsibility for day-to-day physical security is shared along agreed lines. But the performance of the Malaysian personnel involved is poor.
• Given the division of responsibilities agreed with the Malaysians, the fact that the Base is their property and occupied by them, and the sensitivity of the matter – especially in the performance of their personnel – it is to be recognised that security standards at the base will continue to fall short of those we should like to obtain. We must accept, in remaining at Butterworth, a higher degree of risk than we would if the Base were under the exclusive control of the RAAF. The additional risk is difficult to quantify but is assessed to be acceptable for the time being.
• … In addition, Malaysian reluctance having been overcome, the ANZUK force will now provide one infantry company on rotation through Butterworth on a full-time basis, ostensibly for training, flag-showing and a change of scene. The presence of this company will provide the Commander with a ready-reaction force which he can use inter alia to supplement elements available to him under the joint Malaysian-RAAF Plan, but short of an actual overt breach of security the Commander cannot use these troops for guard of other security duties.
• While COMANZUFOR [Commander, ANZUK Force] has responsibility for the security of all forces under his command, including RAAF at Butterworth, it is recognised that the question of Butterworth security overall is  very largely a bilateral Australian-Malaysian matter in which COMANZUFOR does not have standing.

Tange’s letter confirms agreement had been reached with Malaysia regarding a shared defence arrangement for Butterworth which gave the OC RAAF Butterworth responsibility for internal security. Further, it confirmed the full-time presence of an ANZUK infantry company at Butterworth as a ‘ready-reaction force.’

Part 1 of ‘The Coming of the Lie’ reported Defence’s claims that the presence of the rifle company at Butterworth was primarily for training purposes and to ‘provide a real sense of ground force presence in Malaysia for most of the year.’

On 29 May 2014 the Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence, the Hon. Stuart Robert MP, wrote to Dr, Dennis Jensen MP, Chair, Standing Committee on Petitions, enclosing a copy of the Nature of Service Branch’s report of 3 March 2014.  The Minister informed Dr Jensen that a ‘senior research officer … [had] conducted a thorough examination of available official documentation held at the Australian War Memorial and the National Archives of Australia.’

The evidence cited in Parts 1 to 3 of ‘The Coming of the Lie’ is found in ‘official documentation held at … the National Archives of Australia.’ It would, therefore, have been available to the ‘senior research officer’ in his or her ‘thorough examination of available official documentation held at … the National Archives of Australia.’ Yet there is no mention of it in the NOSB report. Why?

The evidence could not be clearer. At the time real concerns were held regarding Butterworth security, one of which was that fact that the Army Company’s presence could not be assured. In response to these concerns an infantry company was permanently deployed to Butterworth and placed at the disposal of the OC as a ‘ready-reaction force.’ The real reason for the deployment could not be revealed publicly owing the Malaysian sensitivities and so the purpose of ‘training, flag-showing and a change of scene’ were used as a cover.

The lie, which Defence maintain to this day, had been established.

Further posts will continue this theme.

SOURCES:

National Australian Archives, NAA: A703, 564/8/28 Part 3, RAAF Butterworth – Ground defence plans

National Australian Archives, NAA: A703, 566/2/148 Part 5, Formation, organisation and movement – HQ RAAF Butterworth