The Coming of the Lie, Part 1

Defence’s Nature of Service Branch (NOSB), in its “Background Paper Parliamentary Petition, Dated 3 March 2014, Rifle Company Butterworth 1970-1989”, draw on documents from the 1969 – 1971 period in an attempt to underline their position that the primary role of army companies rotated through Butterworth in the period to the end of the Insurgency War in 1989 were primarily deployed for training purposes and to ‘provide a real sense of ground force presence in Malaysia for most of the year’ (para. 50) . They claim the rotation of an ANZUK company from the 28th Commonwealth Brigade based in Singapore commenced in 15 November 1970. While there would be periods throughout the year when the company would be required elsewhere owing to Brigade commitments elsewhere, it could, when present, be placed at the disposal of the Officer Commanding (OC) Butterworth if required in a security emergency (Para’s. 3, 49-60). These facts are not contested.

However, significant developments during 1971 led to the permanent deployment of an infantry company to Butterworth for security purposes. Because of the political sensitivities at the time, the real reason for the company’s presence remained ‘secret’ with its presence being explained as for training, ground presence and flag flying.

This is the first of a series of posts (number to be determined) examining the available evidence from 1971 to early 1972 leading to the development of the ‘training’ lie. Documents referred to are located in the National Australian Archives and are available to the public – and therefore the NOSB researcher.

On 11 March 1971, the Australian High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, J.R. Rowland, wrote to representatives of the Departments of Foreign Affairs (Attn. Mr M.J. Cook), Defence (Attn. Mr. G. Blakers, OBE, and JIO), Air (Attn. DAFI) and Headquarters RAAF, Air Base Butterworth (Attn. Air Cdre I.S. Parker, DFC, AFC) in  memo headed ‘Air Base Butterworth – Security’ (Folio 107). Attached was ‘a record of conversation between the Deputy Director Military Intelligence [Lt. Col. Ahmad Bin Haji Abdul Kadir, ABS, PKK] and the Services Adviser staff [Group Captain J.C. Thorp and Lt. Col. R.J. Gardner, OBE] concerning the general security situation in Malaysia.’ The readers’ attention was drawn particularly ‘to the reference to … Butterworth security in general and the CTO [Communist Terrorist Organisation] activity in the Kulim district in particular.’ He advised that his office had ‘been watching the situation in … [this] area for some time’ and reminded readers that he had previously asked if ‘Butterworth was on a general distribution list of intelligence information …’

While the High Commissioner acknowledged the Lt. Col. considered the threat ‘more serious than Special Branch’ it was considered that as the army was closer to the threat their view was credible. Lt. Col. Ahmad was judged by the Australian officers to be ‘of good quality, apparently well trained in all aspects of his duties … a clear and progressive thinker and … obviously concerned over the situation on the Thai/Malaysian border.’ His information was considered ‘highly reliable’, since a lot of it was already known and hence easy to corroborate.

 Because of the closeness of Butterworth to operations against the communists in the border areas the High Commission staff had been concerned for some time about the possible threat to the base. This concern had been heightened by the discovery of communist camps in the Kulim area and evidence the CTs [Communist Terrorists] were moving back into what had been a ‘bad area’ during the earlier Emergency. Air bases had proved popular targets to terrorists in Vietnam and, later, Cambodia, with attacks being launched from surrounding areas by mortar or by satchel attacks on aircraft placed by infiltrators. While it was considered that mortar attacks were improbable given there was no evidence the CTs possessed these, it was foreseen that the communists could consider Butterworth an attractive target. These attacks could be against the RMAF in reprisal for operations conducted against the CTs, or the Mirages as the Communists considered Butterworth a foreign base. While the High Commissioner considered ‘the immediate risk may not be great … the  report of an attack against a railway bridge only eight miles from the base does suggest that it could be unwise to disregard the possibility of some trouble.’

The Malaysian Officer agreed that efforts by the Army against the enemy in the border area had recently deteriorated owing to a shift in focus for military operations. He saw this as potentially making it easier for the CTO infiltrate the southern area of the 6th Malaysian Infantry Brigade’s [6MIB] territory – which included the area around Butterworth.

While official estimated strength of the MNLF [Malayan National Liberation Front] in the border region was 15,000 the Officer considered this to be more like 20,000. Additionally, there were an estimated 27,000 sympathisers in the Penang/Province Wellesley area, some of whom may have been employed on the Base.

An estimated 20 militants had been active in the Kulim area, probably from May 1970. Their aim at this stage was to re-establish contacts with supporters, establish a training complex and recruit from the local population. A militant captured in January 1971 disclosed the recent movement of 24 trainees into the area.

Lt. Col. Ahmad reported ‘the threat to all RMAF Bases was now very seriously regarded’ and, apart from anything else an attack ‘would be a good moral victory for the CTO.’ He assessed Butterworth ‘a probable target’ owing to the number of sympathisers in the area and the recent increase in enemy numbers.

In paragraph 7 of his 8 paragraph memorandum the High Commissioner wrote:

The present memorandum is simply for your information; I have thought that your attention should be drawn to the matter, because of the important policy implications for us if at some point there were to be some attack which resulted in the loss or damage of Australian equipment, or even Australian lives. Presumably, acceptance of such a risk is a necessary corollary of our being at Butterworth at all, but you may like to consider at which point you might which to put Ministers in the picture.

As will be seen in the next post, if ministers were not put ‘in the picture’ following receipt of the memo, it would not be long before one Minister in particular began to take an active interest in the matter.

Source

National Australian Archives, NAA: A703, 564/8/28 PART 3, ‘RAAF Butterworth – Ground defence plans’, folios 107 – 102.