The Coming of the Lie, Part 2

In the introduction to their paper ‘Security of Australian Personnel and Assets Air Base Butterworth’, dated 27 April 1971, Wing Commanders J.A. Downie, SR (GD) and R.D. Barnes, PM, point to political and security instability experienced in Malaysia since the end of the Emergency, dissident activity in the Kulim area and the possible threat to Butterworth.

The general political and security situation in Malaysia has been unstable since period of the Emergency. The riots of 1967 and 1969 culminating in the formation of the National Operation Committee has been an indication of the measure of this condition. Dissident action in the Kulim district has drawn attention to the possible vulnerability of Butterworth …

The authors note that the situation has been given publicity in Australia, listing three recent newspaper articles critical of security at Butterworth as evidence:

• ‘Our Defences are Down’, J. Hoffman, Sydney Morning Herald, March 11.
• ‘Rebels Threaten RAAF Bases’, Sydney Sunday Telegraph, 18 April.
• ‘Our Vulnerable Base’, Mike Cavanaugh, Canberra News, 22 April.

The paper had as its aim ‘to study the threat to Air Base Butterworth, and the adequacy of the defence arrangements.’ To achieve its purpose it was broken into four sections:

• Threat Assessment
• Comments on Available Forces
• Conclusions
• Recommendations

The paper was forwarded to the DCAS under the cover of a minute dated 28 April 71 from the DGOR. The DGOR explained that the report was based on ‘departmental files and from signals between us and Butterworth.’ (Folio 114)

Threat Assessment

There was little in the threat assessment that added to information already known as reported in Part 1. Of the estimated 25,000 communists in the border region 1,200 to 1,500 were believed to be CTs. Little intelligence information was available from the local population for fear of communist reprisals. A recent attack on railway tracks – not bridge as had been reported in newspaper article – had been attributed to the work of dissidents, not militants, for propaganda rather than military purposes. Acknowledging that any estimate of the seriousness of the threat to Butterworth was ‘largely guesswork’ it concluded the ‘immediate risk’ did ‘not appear to be great.’ To date, attacks had been for propaganda rather than military objectives, and an attack on a facility such as Butterworth may result in military reprisals the communists were not yet prepared to risk. This did not mean the risk of attack could be ignored with the most likely threat being uncoordinated actions by dissident groups.

Malaysia had assumed responsibility for ‘the day to day peacetime security’ of the Base on 1 April 1971. This responsibility had previously resided with the RAF Regiment (NOSB, 2014, para. 17). The Malaysian Ministry of Defence had made a total of 266 MMP (Malaysian Military Police) available for this role, which included ‘entry control, security guarding and part of the normal base patrol measures.’  The RAAF employed a team of locally employed civilians, RAAF Police Auxiliaries to guard the Mirage lines. These were trained dog handlers. Additionally, the RAAF Service Police patrolled base married quarters. These arrangements had ‘proved satisfactory to date to meet the guarding requirements in a normal situation.’

A security plan was in place ‘To protect service property and nominated persons in the Butterworth area’ to protect against ‘covert of overt action caused or threatened by CTs or dissidents …’ The plan was to be implemented in four stages according to the threat level to combat ‘sabotage or malicious damage; civil unrest arising from racial troubles or industrial disputes; the withdrawal of civil labour; and interruption to essential services such as light, water, supplies and waste disposal.’ It relied heavily on RAAF manpower that could be supplemented by other resources if available.

Comments on Available Forces

The report identified deficiencies with the current arrangements.

Malaysian Military Police

The MMP were responsible for security of the Base and certain Malaysian assets and would continue in this role in an emergency. However, their presence could not be assured as they ‘could be withdrawn by a higher authority in part or in toto in an internal security situation.’ Little wonder the authors stated ‘This is a most unsatisfactory situation for the base commander.’

RAAF Auxiliaries

Prior to the introduction of the MMP the RAAF had employed 110 Auxiliary indigenous dog handlers. Although this Force had since been disbanded 14 were retained to provide security for RAAF assets, including the Mirages and bomb dump. This measure was opposed by Headquarters Butterworth on competency grounds. No action to date had been taken on a proposal to replace auxiliaries with 15 RAAF Security Guards.

Base Combatant Personnel

RAAF personnel were considered sufficiently trained for their secondary security role. However, a prolonged emergency could seriously impact their primary role and the function of the Base. Prolonged absence of a member in a security situation could have an adverse effect on family morale.

Australian Army Elements

The army role was under consideration. Its presence could not be guaranteed owing to both planned and unplanned absences and could not therefore be integrated into the defence plan. The report’s authors considered it should ‘be regarded as a bonus’ if it was ‘available during a situation requiring its deployment.’

External Forces Committed to the Base Security Plan

The availability of other Commonwealth forces in the area, including those at Minden Barracks, were likewise considered a bonus as their future in the area was uncertain.

Conclusions

The report recognised available intelligence was inadequate to make an accurate assessment of the situation. While the threat to the Base had not increased of late, it could escalate with deteriorating political or racial conditions.

Forces available to the Officer Commanding would be adequate to meet current and future threats if their presence could be guaranteed, the Auxiliary dog handling force was inadequate, and reliance on Base combatant personnel in a prolonged security ‘could adversely affect the primary function of the RAAF component’.

Recommendations

These included:

• All possible steps be taken to obtain, evaluate and disseminate to interested parties intelligence regarding the Butterworth area.
• Defining the role and availability of all resources for the Defence of Butterworth, including the MMP, Australian Army Element and other forces.
• If sufficient resources could not be guaranteed, arranging for their replacement. Regarding the Army, replacing these with RAAF resources.
• Replacing the Auxiliary dog handlers with 15 RAAF Security Guards.
• Developing a deployment plan for relieving base combatant personnel in a prolonged situation.
• Appropriate staff officers visit Butterworth to investigate the situation in order to advise and make recommendations for the improvement of Butterworth security.

The DGOR advised in his minute of 28 April to the DCAS that this last recommendation would require ministerial approval.

The following day, Air Commodore G.T. Newstead, DGOR, advised the DGPS that the DCAS had approved the travel and requested the DGPS to obtain ministerial approval for one of the officers. He was to make arrangements for the other.

Less than a week later, as confirmed by correspondence addressed to the Secretary, Department of Defence, ‘Air Base Butterworth – Security’, from F.J. Green, identified as ‘Secretary’ of 5 May, the two staff officers were in Butterworth (folio 152).

Sources:

• National Australian Archives, NAA: A703, 564/8/28 Part 3, RAAF Butterworth – Ground defence plans
• Nature of Service Branch, Department of Defence, ‘Background Paper Parliamentary Petition Dated 3 March 2014 Rifle Company Butterworth 1970-1989’, 28 April 2014