Australian Service Medal (Part 1)

This is the first of a yet-to-be determined number of parts exploring the background to the Australian Service Medal (ASM). It is appropriate to speak of the two versions of the medal as one and the same and only differentiate where necessary. Defence consider them as essentially the same.

While the ASM is relevant to Butterworth service during the Second Malaysian Emergency (SME) comments in this series will not be limited to Butterworth.  The aim is to show how the Departments of Defence and Veterans’ Affairs have allegedly mishandled, either through incompetence, deliberate deceit,  or both, the administration of Veterans’ entitlements associated with the ASM. The scope goes well beyond the SME, embracing a range of declared non-warlike operations going back to 1945.

This series in no way is intended to diminish the legitimate claim for warlike service in Malaysia during the SME. Rather, as the series continues the alleged incompetence, deceit, or both of the two Departments regarding Butterworth will be examined.

THE AWARD AUSTRALIAN SERVICE MEDAL

The ASM, along with the Australian Active Service Medal  (AASM) were introduced in 1989. Shortly after that the three Service Chiefs held a series of meetings ‘to establish its [the ASM] use as a ‘general service medal’ for non-warlike service. The medal’s regulations specifically state it can only be awarded to recognise related to a prescribed non-warlike operation.

Under the Imperial System General Service Medals recognised service in minor campaigns and operations not warranting the issue of a separate medal. Clasps were added to the ribbon to show the campaign or operation the recipient had served in. The ASM and AASM were introduced to continue this tradition.

In 1992 the Service Chiefs agreed to criteria applying to the issue of the ASM. Activities specifically excluded were:

• normal overseas service in diplomatic, representational, exchange, training or Defence cooperation activities, regardless of the hazards associated with that service; and
• assistance in ADF aid to the civil community, either in Australia or overseas, and where that service is integrated with other civilian organisations and any threat does not require the use of uniquely military skills.

Activities not excluded by the above were to be assessed against:

• service not including warlike service activities in a state of declared war or combat operations against an identified enemy or belligerents;
• the likelihood of service being conducted overseas;
• being activities military in nature, utilising military skills and specialist resources according to the area (circumstances) and/or self-protection, rather than an activity involving skills that are available within civilian organisations;
• involving elements of military threat and hazard;
• conducted at the direction of Government, rather than an ADF decision alone; and
• likelihood of the activity being of prolonged duration of 30 days or more.

In 1993, the year after the Defence Chiefs agreed to the conditions applying to the award of the ASM, the Government agreed to use the terms ‘warlike’ and ‘non-warlike’ to determine the conditions of service that would apply to overseas deployments. ‘Warlike service’ basically is applied to service where force is authorised to meet military objectives and there is an expectation that casualties could occur. ‘Non-warlike’ service is applied to service that is considered to be more hazardous than peacetime service but does not have the same risk as ‘warlike’. Casualties could occur but are not expected and may result from environmental risks, such as diseases. The use of force is limited to self-defence.

In 1993 the Government also established the Committee of Inquiry into Defence and Defence Related Awards (CIDA),described in 2008 as ‘possibly the most significant of all reviews dealing with Defence medals’. CIDA recommended the introduction of the ASM 1945-1975 to recognise non-warlike service in that period, a recommendation that was accepted by the Government. Part 2 will comment on the CIDA report.

KEY POINT

The ASM was introduced in 1989 to recognise service on prescribed non-warlike operations. It cannot be awarded for any other purpose.

SOURCES

• Defence Honours and Awards and Commendations Policy Review, 8 February 2008.

• Submission to the Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal, ‘Inquiry into the Recognition of Members of Rifle Company Butterworth for Service in Malaysia between 1970 and 1989’, Vice Chief of the Defence Forces, 23rd June 2010.

Wars Large and Small

The Second Malaysian Emergency  (SME) was considered by the Malayan Communists to be a continuation of the first. In response the Malaysian Government developed strategies based on the success of the British in 1948-1960.

Ong Weichong, in 'Malaysia's defeat of armed communism: The second emergency, 1968-1989' attributes the defeat of the communists to Britain's experience of Empire where fighting small wars with limited resources and minimal force were the norm.  While it was not the initial response Britain moved to the 'small war' response in the early years of the First Emergency.  

Lieutenant General Harold Briggs adopted an integrated civil-military approach, placing all military and civilian security forces under civilian control. Briggs established a system of war executive committees at Federal, State and District level with the aim of developing 'closer civil-military cooperation, improve efficiency and prompt coordinated action ...'

As a result of their experience in earlier conflicts the British saw insurgencies as primarily civil actions with the military in a supporting role. Under Briggs there was a move away from large scale military sweeps to small patrols under the command of sergeants and corporals.  These relied on 'the skills of native trackers, intelligence provided by surrendered enemy personnel ... and Special Branch infiltrators to target selected terrorists with the minimum force required ...'.

Rather than commit further military forces to the conflict the British increased the number of police and paramilitary forces. In one six month period police numbers increased from 9000 to 45000

The use of small decentralised army units improved the flow of intelligence between soldiers, police, public servants and the local population as a result of their closer contact. Junior 'officers learned to react quickly and effectively'. The air role was largely limited to harassment, bombing of carefully selected targets and transportation. Its main use was in the psychological war, dropping propaganda leaflets on the terrorists as they withdrew further and further into the jungle and broadcasting messages encouraging them to surrender.

Ong contrasts the British approach  in Malaya with that of the Americans in Vietnam. The Americans adopted a classical big war approach, relying on their superior technology and firepower. Their indiscriminate use of force that inflicted heavy casualties on those they claimed to be defending lost them support among the local population and at home. In Malaya the coordinated civil-military approach accompanied with the use of minimal force protected the local populace and gained their support to defeat the communists.

SOURCE:

Ong Weichong. 'Malaysia's defeat of armed communism: The second emergency, 1968-1989'. Routledge. Oxon. 2015. Chapter 2

Thailand - a Safe Haven for Malayan Communists (Part 2)

Although it may have appeared that Malaysia and Thailand differed significantly on some matters of regional security Thomas (1977) argued these appearances were deceptive. Both were strongly anti-communist, both were dealing with communist insurgencies - Thailand's being the more serious - with Malaysia having a vested interest in Thailand remaining anti-communist. Malaysia therefore continued to cooperate informally with SEATO. While relationships between the neighbors remained generally cordial there remained two significant obstacles.

Malaysia's commitment to the non-communist block was evidenced by its agreement to retain ANZUK forces within its borders for defence against external aggression. Its reluctance to join SEATO, at least in part, was the belief that many of the large Malaysian Chinese community viewed it as 'an American device for containing China in support of American policy.' SEATO membership may have heightened existing tensions between the Chinese and Malay communities.

The first major difficulty faced by the neighbours was a Muslim separatist movement in Southern Thailand. Four of the five Thai provinces closest to the shared border had significant Muslim majorities, ranging from 61 to 83 percent. The other was home to 19 percent Muslims. In all, the total Muslim population was close to one million.

Linguistically and in religious practice this group were quite similar to their southern neighbours. Some of its leaders were based in Kelantan from where it was able to source funds and some military supplies. The population of Kelantan and other northern Malaysian states were generally sympathetic to the separatists.

Although the Malaysian Government had not in any way supported the separatists for domestic political reasons it had been reluctant to act against them. On the other hand, the Thai’s were concerned domestic political pressure may force the Malaysian Government to support the Thai Muslims in one way or another.

The other sticking point in the relationship was the presence of the Malayan Communists in Southern Thailand. When the few hundred remaining Malay Communists took refuge in Thailand at the end of the 1948 - 1960 Emergency the Thais were not concerned, believing with time they would fade away. Further, Thailand did not have the resources to commit to their eradication. The Communist growth and the fact they had established what in effect were 'liberated zones' and in some places by the mid to late sixties caused a rethink of the situation.

Although Thailand increased its activities against the Communists commencing in 1965 through to the early seventies Thomas claims the way they went about it is evidence shows they did not take the threat seriously. In fact, Thomas states that the main reason for Thai indifference to the Communists was likely the widely held view 'that so long as the MCIs [Malayan Communist Insurgents] existed as a limited but potentially grave threat to the Malaysian government, the latter would refrain from lending support to separatist elements among the Thai Muslim population of South Thailand. In other words, the Thai’s saw the Malayan Communists as a safeguard against Malaysian interference in Thailand's Muslim Insurgency.

The growth in Communist numbers and influence did, however, create some concerns for Thailand. First, there was the possibility the Malayan Communists could cooperate with their Thai counterparts against Thailand. Then there was the likelihood of cooperation with Muslim separatists. Thomas considered both prospects unlikely. Cooperation with the Thai Communists would result in increased against them, thus jeopardising the relative safety they enjoyed in the country. It would also distract from their objective to overturn the Malaysian Government.

Although there was some concern the Malayan Communists could join their Thai counterparts but Thomas considered this unlikely. Resulting Thai action would jeopardise the relative safety they enjoyed in the country and any cooperation with the Thai Communists would divert resources necessary for achieving their objective, as would cooperation with the Muslims. Further Thomas believed that the Muslims and Communists were ideologically incompatible and cooperation would alienate the Muslim supporter base south of the border.

Increased activity from 1965 on did include cooperation with Malaysia. This included intelligence sharing, allowing Malaysian forces to pursue guerillas for up to five miles across the border, joint border patrols and the stationing of some Malaysian security personnel and helicopters in South Thailand. These moves had little real effect.

In early 1976 around 3000 Malaysian security forces with substantial air support pursued a guerrilla group across the border. This resulted in the capture of three camps and some Communist casualties. Several follow-up operations followed, including bombing by aircraft and interrogation of Thai citizens. This resulted in mass demonstrations in the border districts resulting in the Thai’s expelling Malaysian forces and stopping the Malaysians pursuing insurgents into Thai territory.

In October 1976 the Thai government was overthrown by a military coup. The new regime was strongly anti-communist and commenced negotiations with Malaysia on a new agreement. Signed in March 1977, shortly before the publication of Thomas's article, a provision of the agreement allowed combined operations led by a Combined Task Force Commander.

This agreement proved crucial. According to a Malaysian Army history combined operations commencing in early 1977 continued into 1981. These involved a total of 22 infantry battalions with Malaysian forces comprising 80 percent of the forces involved in each operation.

The Singapore Monitor of 11 February 1983, in an article ‘Reds infiltrating the peninsular, says Musa: Guerillas trying to spread out from border hideouts,’ Malaysian Deputy Premier Datuk Musa Hitam stated Communist Terrorists were trying to spread out along the Peninsular as a result of the successes of operations in the border areas. Although Musa did not disclose the number of terrorists in the border region Thai authorities estimated the number to be around 3000.

NOTE:
Thomas based his views on informal discussions with 400 representatives of the Muslim and Chinese communities in Southern Thailand, as well as Government officials.


SOURCES:

• M. Ladd Thomas. ‘The Malayan Communist Insurgents and Thai-Malaysian Relations’. 
• Mohamed Ghazemy Mahmud (Translator). ‘The Malaysian Army’s Battle Against Communist Insurgency 1968-1989’. Army Headquarters, Ministry of Defence, Wisma Pertahanan, Jalan Padang Tembak, 50634 Kuala Lumpur. First Printing and originally published in 2001 in the Malay language as ‘Tentera Darat Manentang Insurgensi Komunis 1968-1989.
• Singapore Monitor. ‘Reds infiltrating the peninsular, says Musa: Guerillas trying to spread out from border hideouts.’ 11 February 1983, page 7.

Thailand - A Safe Haven for Malayayan Communists (Part 1)

The heavily forested mountainous region of Southern Thailand bordering Malaysia provided a safe haven for members of the Malayan Communist Party following their defeat in 1960. Road access was poor, there were few Thai police in the area, the mainly Buddhist Thai officials lacked effective control outside what few towns there were, and they were safe from Commonwealth forces. From here the 500 to 600 surviving hard-core communists were able to regroup, recruit and relaunch their efforts against the Malaysian Government.

Although the largest people group were Thai Moslems, in the rural areas and some towns of the key districts of Sadao and Betong the Chinese were either a significant minority or in some places the majority. Starting with the wealthy all Chinese were finally ‘taxed’ to raise funds for food, medicine and arms. In return the Communists provided protection, with the protected areas experiencing significantly lower crime rates. Communist strongholds were established in these areas, plus the Waeng district, again on the border. This area was also close to the coast of Narathiwat. While most arms were purchased from Thai dealers, some were obtained from overseas and landed at Narathiwat or Pattani.

As they strengthened their presence in the area they also established routes to enable them to move freely from one location to another. They travelled by foot through Moslem areas, avoiding Malaysia. When travelling they purchased food at inflated prices from the Moslems and compensated them scrupulously for any damage done to their crops. Moslems were also given free medicine and, at times, basic medical treatment.

The communists successfully gained the support of the Chinese population, with an estimated 80% of the population 15 years and over being sympathetic. Many gave active support, providing intelligence on the movement of Thai police, couriers and militant recruits. Training camps were established in the jungle, along with other camps for the hard-core guerrillas. In the early days at least they avoided contact with the Thai border police, abandoning camps for new ones rather than stand and fight.

The communists began to extend their operations into Malaysia in 1966 with a few tentative guerrilla strikes. In 1968 they committed to a renewed guerrilla war against Malaysia, initially limiting their activities to the border areas of Kelantan, Perak and Kedah. They started building camps in the Northern Malaysia jungle for training recruits, indoctrinating Chinese youth, logistics, and from which to launch sporadic hit and run attacks.

Large scale communal riots in 1969 created conditions seen by the communists as conducive to their cause among disaffected members of the Chinese community. Efforts to extend their influence in Peninsular Malaysia increased with the building of new camps reaching almost to Kuala Lumpur, efforts to recruit and train young Chinese, and the redevelopment of an underground support network. This was accompanied by an increase in violence.

Communist activity intensified in 1974 following internal divisions which resulted in the formation of two break-away groups. This led to more spectacular and risky attacks than what might otherwise have been expected. By the mid-1970s many new party cells had been formed and attacks had taken place at least as far as 107 kilometres South East of Kuala Lumpur.

By the middle of 1975 four communist regiments were operating on both sides of the Thai-Malaysian border and in the states of Kedah, Perak, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu. There were also a number of assault groups ranging in number from five to eighty men operating independently in the same areas.

According to Ladd, Peninsular Malaysia, especially the Northern and Central areas, faced a ‘serious security threat,’ albeit ‘not yet strong enough to challenge the Government effectively for the control of this area.’

If they required additional manpower for operations in the border area they could draw on a large number of young Thai Chinese who, while not full-time militants had undergone some guerilla training. More importantly, hard-pressed communist fighters could retreat to their Thailand sanctury where they were safe from Malaysian forces and refresh before continuing the fight with Malaysia.

Note: This two part post is based on the first of a two part article on the Malaysian Insurgency by Thomas published in 1977.

Reference

M. Ladd Thomas, The Malayan Communist Insurgency, in Asian Affairs, Vol. 4, No.5 (May – June., 1977), pp. 306-316, published by Taylor & Francis, Ltd.

The Coming of the Lie, Part 3

Specialist officers Wing Commanders J.A. Downie, SR (GD) (Senior Ground Defence Officer) and R.D. Barnes, PM (Provost Marshall) visited Butterworth during the period 4 – 12 May 1971. The purpose of their visit was to investigate security matters at the Base and to advise and make recommendations in light of recent concerns. A copy of their report was forwarded to the Secretary, Department of Defence by F.J. Green, who appears to have been the Secretary, Department of Air, on 28 May 71 (564/8/28 Pt 3, Folio 180, ‘Air Base Butterworth – Security’).

Their paper, ‘Report of Visit by SR(GD) and PM to Headquarters Air Base Butterworth 4th to 12th May 1971,’ dated 25th May 1971 (Folio 178) extended to 9 pages plus annexes. Understandably, it covers ground already covered in parts 1 and 2 of this series. That information will not be repeated.

In addition to key RAAF officers the Wing Commanders also consulted the Officer Commanding the Malaysian Military Police at Butterworth, a representative of the Malaysian Police Force at Alor Star, and received a briefing from representatives of the Malaysian Ministry of Defence.

Following close questioning of local ‘police and military authorities’ it was concluded they concurred with the 1971 JIO threat assessment for Butterworth. A summary was included in their report:

• It is unlikely that any armed action by formed bodies of troops from the CTO of Malaysian Nationalist Liberation Front (MNLF) will be mounted against the base within the next twelve months unless a favourable situation resulted from the diversion of the base security forces and local forces to quell civil disturbance.
• There is a continuing threat from unco-ordinated action by dissident individuals which could result in loss or damage to the assets of the base.
• There is no evidence to indicate that potential enemies have any indirect-fire weapon capability such as mortars.

As stated in Part 2, while the Malaysian Military Police were responsible for Base security, there was a possibility that they could all be withdrawn in response to a security situation elsewhere in the country leaving Butterworth vulnerable to communist attack.

The officers concluded that the threat assessment required a two phase defensive arrangement, ‘apart from the arrangements necessary to protect members, dependents and nominated personnel in the event of civil disturbance.’ These were:

• Day to day security measures to protect the base against the minor threat stated at paragraph 9.b. consisting of routine guarding measures; and,
• The capability to adopt an expanded security posture to counter the unlikely, but nevertheless possible, threat summarised at paragraph 9.a.

It is worth noting that the civil threat alone posed some risk to service members, their families and other civilians, such as teachers, in the Butterworth region to support the Australian presence. This threat alone should be sufficient to demonstrate this was not normal peacetime service as Defence maintain it was. But the threat assessment went further, recognising the possibility, even if unlikely, of an attack.

The officers reported that local RMAF members were ‘untrained in base defence measures and with the exception of aircrew … [were] unarmed.’ Therefore they could play no active role ‘in the base defence plan.’ A request from the Officer Commanding RMAF Butterworth for Australian assistance with training was being considered by the Commanding Officer Base Squadron Butterworth. The competence of the Malaysian Military Police was also questioned with some having been removed ‘for sleeping on duty.’ It was however expected that their performance would improve over time ‘with experience and contact with the RAAF Police.’

Serious reservations were held regarding the locally employed dog handlers (RAAF Auxiliaries referred to in Part 2). Doubts were held regarding their loyalty and it was considered unlikely they ‘would report for duty in an internal security situation.’ The Auxiliaries guarded the Mirage lines between1800 – 0600 hours daily, with two on duty at a time. They were armed with 9 mm pistols and 10 rounds of ammunition.

The Auxiliaries could contact the RAAF Duty Security Controller by portable radio in an emergency. The Security Controller would then despatch ‘one or more unarmed RAAF Police, or if considered necessary, assistance will be requested from the SSP [Malaysian Military Police] who are normally armed with automatic weapons.’ An interesting arrangement.

These arrangements left the Mirages unguarded between 0600 hours when the Auxiliaries stood down and 0800 when the squadrons stood to, and 1600 hours and 1800 hours, the period between squadron stand down and the Auxiliaries stand to. The Mirage lines were also left unguarded between 0600 hours and 0800 hours on non-working days, the period between Auxiliary stand down and SSP stand to.

At the time of writing the OC was taking action to address the guarding shortcomings and Canberra was taking action to replace the Auxiliaries with RAAF Guards and dogs (10 and 10). Action had also been taken to arm the RAAF Police tasked to respond to emergency calls to the Mirage lines.

Current defence arrangements which were described as being effectively ‘three relatively unco-ordinated agencies concerned with base defence’ – the RAAF, RMAF and SSP - were seen as inadequate . At appendix C to the report was a letter from the Officer Commanding RAAF Butterworth, Air Commodore I.S. Parker, to the Australian High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur, ‘Air Base Butterworth – Shared Defence’, dated 16 April 1971.

Air Commodore Parker pointed out that at a conference on 28 May 1970 regarding the protection of facilities shared by ANZUK and Malaysian and Singaporean forces, ‘the Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, preferred that the subject should not be raised at Butterworth for the time being.’ He believed, for reasons given below, that it was time to reconsider the situation:

• the take-over of day-to-day security by the Malaysian Military Police (wef 1 Apr 71);
• the increased strength of Malaysian Forces on the Air Base vis-à-vis RAAF;
• the need to treat the Air Base as an entity for security purposes;
• the fact that there will be periods during which the AS/NZ infantry company will not be available; and
• the unacceptable diversion of RAAF manpower which would be needed to secure all installations vital to the operation of the Air Base, some of which are either Malaysian facilities or in close proximity to areas where the RMAF is in strength.

The report concludes with the following recommendations to the Department of Defence:

• Finalize a shared defence agreement for Air Base Butterworth without delay.
• Ensure that an AUSTARM or ANZUK company is available to the OC Butterworth at al times he considers its presence necessary, or approve the deployment of RAAF Airfield Guards [ADGs] as a permanent Army replacement. (Note: The report considered that two flights of ADGs (67) would be required).
• Encourage the RMAF to improve their ground defence/security capability.
• Ensure the continued operation of RAAF Radio Butterworth. (Note: Comment on RAAF Radio Butterworth has been made previously in the post ‘Radio RAAF Butterworth’s Security Role, posted on 6th April).

On 28 May, three days after the report was received, F.J. Green, who appears to have been the Secretary, Department of Air, forwarded a copy to the Secretary, Department of Defence, under the cover of a letter ‘Air Base Butterworth – Security.’ Green wrote ‘The findings and recommendations of the report are therefore strongly supported by this department …’

Green commented on aspects of the report. Acknowledging Malaysian ‘nationalistic susceptibilities … particularly in relation to ownership and responsibility for defence of the Base, every effort should be made to ensure that the RAAF Officer Commanding is given responsibility for the defence of the Base.’

Regarding the Army Company presence he reiterated the fact its presence at Butterworth could not be ensured. He further stated that, ‘even in the event of a civil disturbance Officer Commanding Butterworth is required to obtain approval of Headquarters 28 CW Brigade before using personnel of the Company for the protection of dependents and protective security of the Base.’

He went on to say these matters had been discussed by the ‘Officer Commanding Butterworth, Commander ANZ Support Group and the High Commission and recommendations made that the company be available at all times and under the control of Officer Commanding Butterworth.’ If this recommendation could not be agreed to Green repeated the view that it would be necessary to provide two flights of ADGs ‘to ensure adequate security of RAAF assets.’

On the same day, Air Vice Marshall Read, Deputy Chief of Air Staff, wrote to the Minister for Defence through the Secretary of Air, attaching a copy of the report. He stated at paragraphs 2 and 3:

• Action has been taken within this Department on matters within our competence to deal with such as, the  replacement of the locally enlisted Police Auxiliaries by RAAF Security Guards. OC RAAF Butterworth is actioning other matters of a local nature such as, the closure of gaps in the guarding arrangements for the base.
• The main problems of shared defence, the role of the attached Army company … should be resolved without delay as they are considered necessary to enable Air Base Butterworth to adequately meet the assessed threat. Those items which  are outside the competence of this Department have been passed to the Department of Defence for consideration.

 

On 2 March 1972 the Secretary, Department of Defence, A. E. Tange, wrote to the Secretary, Department of Air, regarding ‘Security at Butterworth.’ The Secretary stated ‘It will be necessary for us shortly to brief the Minister for Defence on the outcome of various examinations that have been made of the security problem at Butterworth.’ (566/2/148 Pt 5, Folio 52).Tange outlined his understandings of the situation and asked for confirmation or correction. The following quotes are from the letter.

• There is a joint Malaysian-Australian plan for internal security which would be put into operation under the Australian Commander of the  base in an emergency. In addition, responsibility for day-to-day physical security is shared along agreed lines. But the performance of the Malaysian personnel involved is poor.
• Given the division of responsibilities agreed with the Malaysians, the fact that the Base is their property and occupied by them, and the sensitivity of the matter – especially in the performance of their personnel – it is to be recognised that security standards at the base will continue to fall short of those we should like to obtain. We must accept, in remaining at Butterworth, a higher degree of risk than we would if the Base were under the exclusive control of the RAAF. The additional risk is difficult to quantify but is assessed to be acceptable for the time being.
• … In addition, Malaysian reluctance having been overcome, the ANZUK force will now provide one infantry company on rotation through Butterworth on a full-time basis, ostensibly for training, flag-showing and a change of scene. The presence of this company will provide the Commander with a ready-reaction force which he can use inter alia to supplement elements available to him under the joint Malaysian-RAAF Plan, but short of an actual overt breach of security the Commander cannot use these troops for guard of other security duties.
• While COMANZUFOR [Commander, ANZUK Force] has responsibility for the security of all forces under his command, including RAAF at Butterworth, it is recognised that the question of Butterworth security overall is  very largely a bilateral Australian-Malaysian matter in which COMANZUFOR does not have standing.

Tange’s letter confirms agreement had been reached with Malaysia regarding a shared defence arrangement for Butterworth which gave the OC RAAF Butterworth responsibility for internal security. Further, it confirmed the full-time presence of an ANZUK infantry company at Butterworth as a ‘ready-reaction force.’

Part 1 of ‘The Coming of the Lie’ reported Defence’s claims that the presence of the rifle company at Butterworth was primarily for training purposes and to ‘provide a real sense of ground force presence in Malaysia for most of the year.’

On 29 May 2014 the Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence, the Hon. Stuart Robert MP, wrote to Dr, Dennis Jensen MP, Chair, Standing Committee on Petitions, enclosing a copy of the Nature of Service Branch’s report of 3 March 2014.  The Minister informed Dr Jensen that a ‘senior research officer … [had] conducted a thorough examination of available official documentation held at the Australian War Memorial and the National Archives of Australia.’

The evidence cited in Parts 1 to 3 of ‘The Coming of the Lie’ is found in ‘official documentation held at … the National Archives of Australia.’ It would, therefore, have been available to the ‘senior research officer’ in his or her ‘thorough examination of available official documentation held at … the National Archives of Australia.’ Yet there is no mention of it in the NOSB report. Why?

The evidence could not be clearer. At the time real concerns were held regarding Butterworth security, one of which was that fact that the Army Company’s presence could not be assured. In response to these concerns an infantry company was permanently deployed to Butterworth and placed at the disposal of the OC as a ‘ready-reaction force.’ The real reason for the deployment could not be revealed publicly owing the Malaysian sensitivities and so the purpose of ‘training, flag-showing and a change of scene’ were used as a cover.

The lie, which Defence maintain to this day, had been established.

Further posts will continue this theme.

SOURCES:

National Australian Archives, NAA: A703, 564/8/28 Part 3, RAAF Butterworth – Ground defence plans

National Australian Archives, NAA: A703, 566/2/148 Part 5, Formation, organisation and movement – HQ RAAF Butterworth

The Coming of the Lie, Part 2

In the introduction to their paper ‘Security of Australian Personnel and Assets Air Base Butterworth’, dated 27 April 1971, Wing Commanders J.A. Downie, SR (GD) and R.D. Barnes, PM, point to political and security instability experienced in Malaysia since the end of the Emergency, dissident activity in the Kulim area and the possible threat to Butterworth.

The general political and security situation in Malaysia has been unstable since period of the Emergency. The riots of 1967 and 1969 culminating in the formation of the National Operation Committee has been an indication of the measure of this condition. Dissident action in the Kulim district has drawn attention to the possible vulnerability of Butterworth …

The authors note that the situation has been given publicity in Australia, listing three recent newspaper articles critical of security at Butterworth as evidence:

• ‘Our Defences are Down’, J. Hoffman, Sydney Morning Herald, March 11.
• ‘Rebels Threaten RAAF Bases’, Sydney Sunday Telegraph, 18 April.
• ‘Our Vulnerable Base’, Mike Cavanaugh, Canberra News, 22 April.

The paper had as its aim ‘to study the threat to Air Base Butterworth, and the adequacy of the defence arrangements.’ To achieve its purpose it was broken into four sections:

• Threat Assessment
• Comments on Available Forces
• Conclusions
• Recommendations

The paper was forwarded to the DCAS under the cover of a minute dated 28 April 71 from the DGOR. The DGOR explained that the report was based on ‘departmental files and from signals between us and Butterworth.’ (Folio 114)

Threat Assessment

There was little in the threat assessment that added to information already known as reported in Part 1. Of the estimated 25,000 communists in the border region 1,200 to 1,500 were believed to be CTs. Little intelligence information was available from the local population for fear of communist reprisals. A recent attack on railway tracks – not bridge as had been reported in newspaper article – had been attributed to the work of dissidents, not militants, for propaganda rather than military purposes. Acknowledging that any estimate of the seriousness of the threat to Butterworth was ‘largely guesswork’ it concluded the ‘immediate risk’ did ‘not appear to be great.’ To date, attacks had been for propaganda rather than military objectives, and an attack on a facility such as Butterworth may result in military reprisals the communists were not yet prepared to risk. This did not mean the risk of attack could be ignored with the most likely threat being uncoordinated actions by dissident groups.

Malaysia had assumed responsibility for ‘the day to day peacetime security’ of the Base on 1 April 1971. This responsibility had previously resided with the RAF Regiment (NOSB, 2014, para. 17). The Malaysian Ministry of Defence had made a total of 266 MMP (Malaysian Military Police) available for this role, which included ‘entry control, security guarding and part of the normal base patrol measures.’  The RAAF employed a team of locally employed civilians, RAAF Police Auxiliaries to guard the Mirage lines. These were trained dog handlers. Additionally, the RAAF Service Police patrolled base married quarters. These arrangements had ‘proved satisfactory to date to meet the guarding requirements in a normal situation.’

A security plan was in place ‘To protect service property and nominated persons in the Butterworth area’ to protect against ‘covert of overt action caused or threatened by CTs or dissidents …’ The plan was to be implemented in four stages according to the threat level to combat ‘sabotage or malicious damage; civil unrest arising from racial troubles or industrial disputes; the withdrawal of civil labour; and interruption to essential services such as light, water, supplies and waste disposal.’ It relied heavily on RAAF manpower that could be supplemented by other resources if available.

Comments on Available Forces

The report identified deficiencies with the current arrangements.

Malaysian Military Police

The MMP were responsible for security of the Base and certain Malaysian assets and would continue in this role in an emergency. However, their presence could not be assured as they ‘could be withdrawn by a higher authority in part or in toto in an internal security situation.’ Little wonder the authors stated ‘This is a most unsatisfactory situation for the base commander.’

RAAF Auxiliaries

Prior to the introduction of the MMP the RAAF had employed 110 Auxiliary indigenous dog handlers. Although this Force had since been disbanded 14 were retained to provide security for RAAF assets, including the Mirages and bomb dump. This measure was opposed by Headquarters Butterworth on competency grounds. No action to date had been taken on a proposal to replace auxiliaries with 15 RAAF Security Guards.

Base Combatant Personnel

RAAF personnel were considered sufficiently trained for their secondary security role. However, a prolonged emergency could seriously impact their primary role and the function of the Base. Prolonged absence of a member in a security situation could have an adverse effect on family morale.

Australian Army Elements

The army role was under consideration. Its presence could not be guaranteed owing to both planned and unplanned absences and could not therefore be integrated into the defence plan. The report’s authors considered it should ‘be regarded as a bonus’ if it was ‘available during a situation requiring its deployment.’

External Forces Committed to the Base Security Plan

The availability of other Commonwealth forces in the area, including those at Minden Barracks, were likewise considered a bonus as their future in the area was uncertain.

Conclusions

The report recognised available intelligence was inadequate to make an accurate assessment of the situation. While the threat to the Base had not increased of late, it could escalate with deteriorating political or racial conditions.

Forces available to the Officer Commanding would be adequate to meet current and future threats if their presence could be guaranteed, the Auxiliary dog handling force was inadequate, and reliance on Base combatant personnel in a prolonged security ‘could adversely affect the primary function of the RAAF component’.

Recommendations

These included:

• All possible steps be taken to obtain, evaluate and disseminate to interested parties intelligence regarding the Butterworth area.
• Defining the role and availability of all resources for the Defence of Butterworth, including the MMP, Australian Army Element and other forces.
• If sufficient resources could not be guaranteed, arranging for their replacement. Regarding the Army, replacing these with RAAF resources.
• Replacing the Auxiliary dog handlers with 15 RAAF Security Guards.
• Developing a deployment plan for relieving base combatant personnel in a prolonged situation.
• Appropriate staff officers visit Butterworth to investigate the situation in order to advise and make recommendations for the improvement of Butterworth security.

The DGOR advised in his minute of 28 April to the DCAS that this last recommendation would require ministerial approval.

The following day, Air Commodore G.T. Newstead, DGOR, advised the DGPS that the DCAS had approved the travel and requested the DGPS to obtain ministerial approval for one of the officers. He was to make arrangements for the other.

Less than a week later, as confirmed by correspondence addressed to the Secretary, Department of Defence, ‘Air Base Butterworth – Security’, from F.J. Green, identified as ‘Secretary’ of 5 May, the two staff officers were in Butterworth (folio 152).

Sources:

• National Australian Archives, NAA: A703, 564/8/28 Part 3, RAAF Butterworth – Ground defence plans
• Nature of Service Branch, Department of Defence, ‘Background Paper Parliamentary Petition Dated 3 March 2014 Rifle Company Butterworth 1970-1989’, 28 April 2014