The Coming of the Lie, Part 1

Defence’s Nature of Service Branch (NOSB), in its “Background Paper Parliamentary Petition, Dated 3 March 2014, Rifle Company Butterworth 1970-1989”, draw on documents from the 1969 – 1971 period in an attempt to underline their position that the primary role of army companies rotated through Butterworth in the period to the end of the Insurgency War in 1989 were primarily deployed for training purposes and to ‘provide a real sense of ground force presence in Malaysia for most of the year’ (para. 50) . They claim the rotation of an ANZUK company from the 28th Commonwealth Brigade based in Singapore commenced in 15 November 1970. While there would be periods throughout the year when the company would be required elsewhere owing to Brigade commitments elsewhere, it could, when present, be placed at the disposal of the Officer Commanding (OC) Butterworth if required in a security emergency (Para’s. 3, 49-60). These facts are not contested.

However, significant developments during 1971 led to the permanent deployment of an infantry company to Butterworth for security purposes. Because of the political sensitivities at the time, the real reason for the company’s presence remained ‘secret’ with its presence being explained as for training, ground presence and flag flying.

This is the first of a series of posts (number to be determined) examining the available evidence from 1971 to early 1972 leading to the development of the ‘training’ lie. Documents referred to are located in the National Australian Archives and are available to the public – and therefore the NOSB researcher.

On 11 March 1971, the Australian High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, J.R. Rowland, wrote to representatives of the Departments of Foreign Affairs (Attn. Mr M.J. Cook), Defence (Attn. Mr. G. Blakers, OBE, and JIO), Air (Attn. DAFI) and Headquarters RAAF, Air Base Butterworth (Attn. Air Cdre I.S. Parker, DFC, AFC) in  memo headed ‘Air Base Butterworth – Security’ (Folio 107). Attached was ‘a record of conversation between the Deputy Director Military Intelligence [Lt. Col. Ahmad Bin Haji Abdul Kadir, ABS, PKK] and the Services Adviser staff [Group Captain J.C. Thorp and Lt. Col. R.J. Gardner, OBE] concerning the general security situation in Malaysia.’ The readers’ attention was drawn particularly ‘to the reference to … Butterworth security in general and the CTO [Communist Terrorist Organisation] activity in the Kulim district in particular.’ He advised that his office had ‘been watching the situation in … [this] area for some time’ and reminded readers that he had previously asked if ‘Butterworth was on a general distribution list of intelligence information …’

While the High Commissioner acknowledged the Lt. Col. considered the threat ‘more serious than Special Branch’ it was considered that as the army was closer to the threat their view was credible. Lt. Col. Ahmad was judged by the Australian officers to be ‘of good quality, apparently well trained in all aspects of his duties … a clear and progressive thinker and … obviously concerned over the situation on the Thai/Malaysian border.’ His information was considered ‘highly reliable’, since a lot of it was already known and hence easy to corroborate.

 Because of the closeness of Butterworth to operations against the communists in the border areas the High Commission staff had been concerned for some time about the possible threat to the base. This concern had been heightened by the discovery of communist camps in the Kulim area and evidence the CTs [Communist Terrorists] were moving back into what had been a ‘bad area’ during the earlier Emergency. Air bases had proved popular targets to terrorists in Vietnam and, later, Cambodia, with attacks being launched from surrounding areas by mortar or by satchel attacks on aircraft placed by infiltrators. While it was considered that mortar attacks were improbable given there was no evidence the CTs possessed these, it was foreseen that the communists could consider Butterworth an attractive target. These attacks could be against the RMAF in reprisal for operations conducted against the CTs, or the Mirages as the Communists considered Butterworth a foreign base. While the High Commissioner considered ‘the immediate risk may not be great … the  report of an attack against a railway bridge only eight miles from the base does suggest that it could be unwise to disregard the possibility of some trouble.’

The Malaysian Officer agreed that efforts by the Army against the enemy in the border area had recently deteriorated owing to a shift in focus for military operations. He saw this as potentially making it easier for the CTO infiltrate the southern area of the 6th Malaysian Infantry Brigade’s [6MIB] territory – which included the area around Butterworth.

While official estimated strength of the MNLF [Malayan National Liberation Front] in the border region was 15,000 the Officer considered this to be more like 20,000. Additionally, there were an estimated 27,000 sympathisers in the Penang/Province Wellesley area, some of whom may have been employed on the Base.

An estimated 20 militants had been active in the Kulim area, probably from May 1970. Their aim at this stage was to re-establish contacts with supporters, establish a training complex and recruit from the local population. A militant captured in January 1971 disclosed the recent movement of 24 trainees into the area.

Lt. Col. Ahmad reported ‘the threat to all RMAF Bases was now very seriously regarded’ and, apart from anything else an attack ‘would be a good moral victory for the CTO.’ He assessed Butterworth ‘a probable target’ owing to the number of sympathisers in the area and the recent increase in enemy numbers.

In paragraph 7 of his 8 paragraph memorandum the High Commissioner wrote:

The present memorandum is simply for your information; I have thought that your attention should be drawn to the matter, because of the important policy implications for us if at some point there were to be some attack which resulted in the loss or damage of Australian equipment, or even Australian lives. Presumably, acceptance of such a risk is a necessary corollary of our being at Butterworth at all, but you may like to consider at which point you might which to put Ministers in the picture.

As will be seen in the next post, if ministers were not put ‘in the picture’ following receipt of the memo, it would not be long before one Minister in particular began to take an active interest in the matter.

Source

National Australian Archives, NAA: A703, 564/8/28 PART 3, ‘RAAF Butterworth – Ground defence plans’, folios 107 – 102.

Radio RAAF Butterworth's Security Role

In early 1971 at least two newspapers published articles critical of security arrangements at Butterworth. Subsequently two specialist officers were sent to the base to report on the security situation and the arrangements in place.

Their report, dated 25 May 1971, made specific mention of the role of RAAF Radio Butterworth at paragraphs 50 – 53:

50.        RAAF Radio Butterworth (RRB) is a voluntary staffed organization sponsored through welfare grants, mess donations and their own fund raising efforts. To maintain RRB a budget of about $M12,500 is required annually. The station broadcasts for 134 hours per week giving 24 hours service on Friday and Saturday and 0600-2300 hours service on other days. A staff of about 60 is employed; dependants strongly supporting serving members. The standards of broadcasts have been praised by ABC authorities.

51.       Within the terms of HQBUT Operation Orders 1/70 the station provides a necessary link between RAAF authorities and families and arrangements have been made for scheduled broadcasts and message passing during an emergency security situation.

52.     Radio Malaysia accepts RRB broadcasting in opposition to its own services. However tight control is maintained on programme content. Notwithstanding the licence to operate could be withdrawn at any time.

53.    The service provided is essential for morale reasons, and dissemination of messages etc in emergency circumstances. Financial backing for the facility and its continued operation should therefore be assured.

The full report provides the historical background to the permanent deployment of a rifle company to Butterworth to ensure adequate security forces were present to respond to the assessed risk. More will be posted after I return from a couple of weeks holiday.

Source: NAA. A703, 564/8/28 Part 3, RAAF Butterworth – Ground defence plans (171).

The Threat of Mortar Attack

‘The introduction of the new weapon into the CTO inventory has potentially grave effects for Butterworth’ (Nov 75).

While the Department of Defence’s Nature of Service Branch (NOSB) in its “Background Paper Parliamentary Petition, Dated 3 March 2014, Rifle Company Butterworth 1970-1989” acknowledged there was a possible threat to Butterworth from communist acquired mortars, they fail to expand on the threat. Why?

To quote the NOSB report, starting at paragraph 36:

36.     In 1975 while OC RAAF Base Butterworth believed there is little threat to the Base. DAFI Report No 33 on security at Butterworth in July 1975 notes that:

The possibility of the CT possessing operational mortars adds to the threat against Air Base Butterworth. However, it is most likely that warning of an impending attack would be received prior to the attack taking place. (Cited DAFI Minute INT 8/10/3 Security Situation – Air Base Butterworth Report 33 dated 3 July 1975)

37.     DAFI also saw a threat from indirect weapons such as 81/82mm mortars as expressed in DAFI Report No. 34. (Referenced - SRGD-AF Minute 564/8/28(73) dated 16 July 1975 to DGOR-AF)

38.     On 23 July 1975 the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) advised it could not confirm the CTs had mortars without further substantial evidence, although the advice did discuss the likely challenges faced by a defending force if it was to seek to prevent their use. (Referenced – JIO JSI/85 Security – Butterworth Air Base dated 23 July 1975, to DAFI)

39.     DAFI considered that as a result of increased use of the base by RMAF for airstrikes against CT targets, the base faced a greater chance of becoming a target:

Continued use of the Butterworth as a base for ground-attack against the CT can only increase its attractiveness as a target … From this point of view, the threat to the Air Base Butterworth must be considered to be slowly increasing. (Cited DAFI Minute INT 8/10/3 (150) Security Situation – Air Base Butterworth Report 34 dated 4 August 1975)

 Copies of the four documents referenced above by NOSB are in the possession of the author. These documents, along with others referenced by NOSB, acknowledge the presence of a threat to Butterworth, including the fact it was used by the Malaysians as a ‘base for ground-attack against the CT …’ As demonstrated in other posts, because the threat of attack from an armed enemy known to be active in the region could not be ruled out, Australian service personnel at Butterworth – and, in fact, Peninsular Malaysia – incurred danger from the  hostile forces of an enemy and should therefore receive full repatriation benefits.

As with other sections of NOSB’s report, key evidence is omitted in what can only be seen as an attempt to downplay the threat.

  

DAFI Minute INT 8/10/3 Security Situation – Air Base Butterworth Report 33 dated 3 July 1975

 Quoted in the NOSB report at para. 36 (above).

NOSB quotes para. 9 of this report. Rather than saying ‘…it is most likely that warning of an impending attack would be received prior to the attack taking place’ the document states ‘…it is most unlikely that warning of an impending attack would be received prior to the attack taking place’.

First, the possibility of an attack, whether or not prior warning was received, does not negate the fact that personnel at Butterworth Base ‘incurred danger from the hostile forces of an enemy’. The omission of ‘un’ could have been a ‘typo’. However, a deliberate omission would be consistent with other attempts by NOSB to downplay the risk to Butterworth throughout their report by quoting out of context or ignoring key evidence showing the real state of affairs at the time.

(Document accessed at 564/8/28(174))

Comparison of para. 9 in the original (top) and the NOSB 'quote'

  

  SRGD-AF Minute 564/8/28(73) dated 16 July 1975 to DGOR-AF

Quoted in the NOSB report at para. 37 (above).

This minute acknowledges the OC [Officer Commanding] Butterworth’s belief that there was little threat to the Base (see NOSB para. 36, above). It explains the OC considered any external threat would be posed by rockets similar to those used in other attacks in the country. These had limited range and would expose the firer to villagers friendly to the RAAF in surrounding villages. In para. 3 the author, Wing Commander J.I. Brough, SRGD-AF, reports that the OC’s view was not shared by DAFI:

However, there is some disagreement between this view and that of DAFI, who believes that the CT have 81 or 82 mm mortars (range approx. 3000m) available to them. If this is true in puts an entirely different viewpoint on the matter, and we may have to consider additional security measures, for example, revetments and off-base patrolling by the infantry company.

The Wing Commander added that he thought ‘it prudent to agree to a review of the threat’. Having acknowledged the document, why didn’t NOSB explain the threat.

(Document repositioned to folio 178)

JIO JSI/85 Security – Butterworth Air Base dated 23 July 1975, to DAFI

 Quoted in the NOSB report at para. 38 (above).

The report explained that mortars had greater range than rockets, were more destructive and were much more difficult to defend against:

… A rough rule of thumb is that an infantry battalion deployed in a defensive position can hold a front of 1000 metres in close country and 2000 metres in open country. The attached map shows that at a distance of 3000 metres from the base, a perimeter is formed of 16,000 metres. While it is not suggested that armies will every have enough troops to man such a perimeter, the vulnerability of such an installation to insurgent mortar attacks is readily apparent. The problem posed by mortars is much greater that that posed by 3.5 inch rockets, on the bases of range, destructive power and accuracy.

The author informed that further information on CTO weapons acquisition would be forwarded as it came to hand.

Further documents available to NOSB reveal on-going, escalating concern with the mortar threat.

On 7 October 1975 the Chief of Air Staff (CAS), Air Vice Marshall J.A. Rowland, wrote to the Minister informing of current security concerns and making recommendations for an upcoming meeting of the Minister with the Malaysian Prime Minister. There was increased concern over the security of areas surrounding the Base owing to recent intelligence reports indicating the possibility of communist intentions to launch rocket attacks on bases in Malaysia. He reiterated the concern at the possibility of the CT possessing mortars and expressed the view that a minimum of two infantry battalions were required to provide an effective deterrent against rocket and mortar attacks on the Base. He also acknowledged that ‘Even at this level … security of the area at night must remain doubtful’. Among the recommendations was a request to Malaysia for the allocation of ‘at least one battalion to the area immediately surrounding Butterworth for area defence’. (Security of Butterworth, from J.A. Rowland, CAS, 564/8/28(290).

On 14 October, the Deputy Chief of Air Staff, AVM N.P. McNamara, wrote to DJS as a follow-up to the communication between the CAS and Minister on the 7th. He advised of continued concern over the lack of Malaysian army units around Butterworth while at the same time acknowledging the presence of such could not remove the possibility of an attack.

We also recognise that as Armies and Air Forces have different primary roles, the Air Force commander responsible for the ground defence and security of an Air Base, can never be guaranteed the continuance of Army presence if other priorities influence the local Army Commander. Therefore, at Butterworth, if the allocation of even one battalion were arranged, its tenure of occupancy in a defensive posture is unlikely to be unconditionally assured. In any case, determined DTs would have only limited difficulty in infiltrating onto the airfield or to within 3.5 inch rocket or 81/82mm mortar range. At best, an infantry battalion represents a deterrent presence.

Given the continued vulnerability of the Base to attack, regardless of the outcome of the upcoming meeting with the Malaysian Prime Minister, the DCAS advised the ‘requirement for blast protection of aircraft against ground burst weapons and small arms fire together with aircraft dispersal is currently under review. (Security of Butterworth, N.P. McNamarra, DCAS, 564/8/28(293).

(JSI Document sourced at 568/8/28(233))

 DAFI Minute INT 8/10/3 (150) Security Situation – Air Base Butterworth Report 34 dated 4 August 1975

Quoted in the NOSB report at para. 39 (above).

The minute reported that air strikes were carried out from Butterworth on July 25th and 26th. It also informed of a recent report indicating ‘that the security arrangements at the Base are less than adequate.’  Para.s 6 and 7 state:

… No posts are permanently manned by security forces in the area immediately surrounding Butterworth. Two observation towers which have been built on the eastern boundary are still waiting for the installation of seachlights, and are not manned. External patrolling of the Air Base only takes place if a VIP is visiting, or a positive threat exists.

Local authorities have stated that no Malaysian Security Force contingency plan exists for the reinforcement of Air Base Butterworth. It is not known if such a plan exists at the Ministry of Defence. A locally known plan, which has been implemented once in 1975, allows for the deployment of troops from HQ 6MIB are fairly heavily committed on the Thai/Malaysian border and the size of the force that could be sent to Butterworth depends largely on this commitment. The nearest artillery units to Butterworth are at Taiping.

Of note is the fact that a local contingency plan for the reinforcement of Butterworth was implemented once in 1975 – although no further details are provided.

This advice was included in the above advice to the Minister by the CAS.

An earlier document, ‘Annex A to HQBUT 5/1/AIR (72), dated 11 July 1975, Security – Air Base Butterworth’ confirmed ‘Isolated CT incidents and consequent Security Forces follow-up operations adjacent to Air Base Butterworth have been reported in HQ RAAF Butterworth Intelligence Reports to DAFI’ (included in 564/8/28(230).

(Security Report 34 sourced at 564/8/28(184))

Capture of Unidentified CTO Weapon

 Wing Commander R.A. Brazier, SRGD, in a minute to DGOR-AF dated 21 Nov 75, advised of the recent capture of two yet-to-be identified weapons. He attached ‘a photograph obtained from discreet sources …’ and stated that the fact both weapons were captured in the one engagement indicated the number of weapons was ‘not limited’. He then spelled out what he saw as potential implications for Butterworth:

The introduction of the new weapon into the CTO inventory has potentially grave effects for Butterworth. 3.5” rockets previously used in attacks around BUT have a potential range of 700 metres, but so far have not been used over 400 metres. Weapons which appear to be similar to that capture on 3 Sep, have ranges up to 6,000 m. More importantly, there is now firm evidence that new weapons are being acquired. (564/8/28(309).

According to a hand-written note on the page, the weapons were capture in N.E. Perak, approximately 60 km from Butterworth. A further hand-written comment, dated 12 Jan 76 and signed by the SRGD, noted unconfirmed intelligence indicated the weapon was a mortar manufactured in a ‘backyard foundry in N. Vietnam’ and that this assessment was waiting for confirmation.

Captured CTO Weapon

 

Revetments Constructed at Butterworth

 In response to the perceived threat of rocket and mortar attack revetments were constructed to limit the damage of an attack on the Mirage flight lines. While the date of construction has not been verified, anecdotal evidence suggest it may have been as early as January 1976. If this is the fact, they were built within two to three months of the DCAS advised the DJS they were under consideration.

That they were constructed within 12 months of the matter being raised by the DCAS in response to mortar and rocket attacks is confirmed by the draft AUSTEO document ‘The RAAF Presence at Butterworth’, attached to the Department of Defence Minute, ‘Review of Butterworth Deployment’, written by R.N. Hamilton, A/First Assistant Secretary, Strategic & International Policy Division, dated 22 October 1976 (Reference: DEF 270/1/4, included in 696/6/4/6 PART 3 (282). Paragraphs 20 and 21 are copied below:

20. The likelihood of a terrorist attack endangering the RAAF deployment in the immediate future is presently assessed to be low. It would probably – but not necessarily – be associated with a significant escalation of CPM activity. This is presently assessed as unlikely. It would probably not occur without warning.

21. If such an attack did occur, however, its implications would be serious. Its most likely form would be an attack of short duration on the base using indirect fire from light mortars of small rockets. There is also the possibility of discriminate of indiscriminate acts of terrorism in the Butterworth or Penang areas generally. In either case Australian personnel – including dependants – and equipment would be endangered. Action has recently been taken to construct revetments to give some protection to the Australian aircraft at Butterworth against attack. The need for improved security on and off the base has also been recognised.

  

Conclusion

 Evidence omitted by NOSB demonstrates that senior Defence and Government officials held serious concerns over what they saw as an escalating security threat to Butterworth that resulted in the construction of revetments to protect the Mirage fleet from possible rocket and mortar attacks. That this evidence was ignored by NOSB in what can only be seen as an attempt to hide the real threat to Butterworth must call in to question their impartiality and objectivity on the matter.

Sources

National Australian Archives:

• NAA: 568/8/28 PART 8, RAAF Butterworth – Ground defence plans

• NAA: 696/6/4/5 PART 3, Butterworth Base - General